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ABSTRACT 
Maritime piracy provides unique challenges for nations that are attempting to 
combat it.  In the 1990s, Southeast Asia was the world’s number one region for pirate 
attacks on maritime vessels, but that statistic has since improved.  In the new millennium, 
the Horn of Africa has eclipsed Southeast Asia to become the top region for pirate 
attacks.  State failure in Somalia, coupled with regional economic and political weakness, 
has allowed piracy to thrive.  Since late 2008, an international response that consists of 
maritime forces from around the world has been assisting the shipping industry by 
providing security.  Thus far, this effort has had mixed success.  As the rate of successful 
attacks has decreased, the frequency at which they occur has continued to increase.  This 
thesis investigates the rise and fall of piracy in Southeast Asia and compares causal 
factors and responses to piracy in the Horn of Africa.  The purpose is to provide an 
analysis of lessons learned in Southeast Asia that could be applied to curtail piracy in the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
State failure poses unique challenges to nations combating piracy because piracy 
is a land-based problem whose solution can only be found on land.  The topic of this 
research is a critical analysis of why the United States and other maritime nations have 
been ineffectual in their efforts to stop maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and 
the adjacent Gulf of Aden region of East Africa.  The major research question asks what 
methods can be used and are most effective to combat piracy under conditions of state 
failure for the United States and other maritime nations.  To answer this question, the 
author conducts a case study of piracy in Southeast Asia, examining causal factors that 
led to the rise and decline of piracy in this region and a case study of piracy in the Horn 
of Africa.  In the conclusion, the author presents an analysis of lessons learned from both 
case studies to determine whether lessons can be learned from Southeast Asia and applied 
to the Horn of Africa.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden are the most dangerous areas for piracy 
in the world. The collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and subsequent conflicts 
have created an environment where piracy has become a way of life for those who live 
along the coast of Somalia.  In 2008, 815 crewmembers were taken hostage from vessels 
hijacked in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. Thus far, in 2009, 478 
crewmembers have been taken hostage.1  To address the growing threat to the region and 
maritime shipping, the United States and other countries have begun working together 
with regional partners to provide stability.  Unfortunately, these efforts have remained 
unsuccessful. Reasons for the failures include weak governance, lack of security, 
geography, corruption and the application of International Law.  
 
1 ICC Commercial Crime Services, “Pirate Attacks off Somalia Already Surpass 2008 Figure,” May 
12, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org (accessed June 4, 2009). 
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Similar to the Horn of Africa, the nature of piracy in Southeast Asia is also 
heavily influenced by geography, weak governance, corruption and lack of security.  A 
decade ago, piracy surged in Southeast Asia, but has since declined sharply because of 
efforts by regional and extra-regional nations working together to find a common 
solution.  As a result of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and political instability, 
Indonesia suffered higher rates of piracy than its neighbors, peaking in 2000 with 119 
incidents and again in 2003 with 121 reported cases.2  In addition, the financial crisis 
caused the value of the Indonesian defense budget to decline by 65% from 1997 to 
1998.3  By 2004, piracy rates throughout Southeast Asia began to decline for several 
reasons, including individual actions taken by regional states to increase security and 
governance, and bilateral and multilateral measures between Straits nations and the 
international community.4  The urgency of the situation makes it necessary to find ways 
to address the piracy problem off the coast of Somalia.  What this suggests is that lessons 
can be learned from the actions taken by nations in Southeast Asia and the international 
community to curb piracy; these lessons can then be applied to the current crisis in the 
Horn of Africa and Gulf of
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The key issues and problems facing the United States and other maritime nations 
today include state failure in Somalia, limited regional and international capabilities, and 
regional and international cooperation. 
1. State Failure 
Piracy is a symptom of state failure in Somalia, which has now extended from the 
land to the sea.  For years, warlords and extremist groups have controlled much of the 
country, except for small areas governed by the fledgling Transitional Federal 
 
2 Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends, ed. Peter Lehr (Routledge: 
New York, 2007), 55. 
3 Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses,” (working 
paper, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies Singapore, 2005). 
4 Joshua Ho, “The Security of Regional Sea Lanes,” working paper, Institute of Defense and Strategic 
Studies Singapore (2005). 
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Government.  Without effective efforts by regional and international nations to invest in 
capacity-building programs that address the root causes of state failure in Somalia—such 
as poverty, lawlessness and corruption—maritime-based approaches are, at best, only 
temporary.  
2. Limited Capabilities 
Somalia, regional, and international governments have limited capabilities to 
combat piracy effectively on their own, either on land or at sea.  For example, the Somali 
Coast Guard has three aging gunboats but lacks funding and training.  Operated by a 
private security company in the Puntland region of Somalia, the effort has no noticeable 
effect.5  Other attempts have been made to create a coastal patrol force, but these have 
failed because of funding, corruption, or both.  
U.S. and coalition forces have limited numbers of ships and aircraft to patrol this 
vast region, including over 2.5 million square miles of ocean.  Without more vessels and 
aircraft, pirates continue to have the upper hand in finding and acquiring ships before 
international forces can intervene. 
3. International Cooperation 
The U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led missions are law 
enforcement operations aimed at deterring and detaining suspected pirates.  The U.S. and 
U.K. currently hold agreements with Kenya that allow for the prosecution of pirates in 
Kenyan courts of law, in exchange for technical assistance and funding. Unfortunately, 
few nations are willing or have the capabilities to assist in the prosecution of pirates. In 
addition, coalition nations and those assisting have separate chains of command 
responsible to their government’s national strategies and priorities.  This can result in 
pirates being released, rather than being incarcerated for their crimes, strengthening 
pirates’ resolve.  
 
5 Steve Mbongo, “Somalia Seeks Aid to Set up Strong Coast Guard,” Business Daily, May 20, 2009, 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/-/539444/600188/-/rv1gi2/-/index.html (accessed June 5, 2009). 
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The preliminary conclusion is that, in the absence of a stable Somali government, 
combating piracy at sea is a temporary measure at best.  Interdicting pirates before they 
leave land provides a promising solution, but one that is unable to be realized because 
regional and international governments are unable or unwilling to absorb the financial 
cost of training officers and maintaining the infrastructure. International naval support 
will continue for the foreseeable future, but is costly to maintain.  The size of the area 
that coalition forces patrol, and the numbers of vessels able to participate, ensures that 
pirates operating from shore—using small boats supported by mother ships to increase 
range—have the advantage.  
In the final analysis, Somali pirates in small fiberglass boats continue to hold 
some of the largest and most sophisticated navies in the world at bay until solutions can 
be found.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The threat of piracy in the Horn of Africa poses a significant problem to regional 
and international governments who use this important waterway.  Over 20,000 ships a 
year pass through this region, including 12% of the world’s oil supply.6  Severe poverty 
and lawlessness create safe havens from which pirates operate without fear of retribution. 
Hefty ransoms paid by insurance companies, eager to secure the safety of their crews and 
cargo, continue the cycle of recruitment and violence, ensuring a never-ending supply of 
recruits. 
Maritime piracy is an endeavor that has been on the margins of society for as long 
as ships have been going to sea. Under international law, piracy is one of seven crimes 
considered so notorious that it is considered a crime against all nations and forms the 
basis for states to intervene.7  The fact that the United States has taken a lead role in the 
interdiction of seaborne piracy should come as no surprise.  The U.S.’s economic 
 
6 James Kraska and Brian Wilson, “Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword,” World Policy Journal 
25, no. 4 (Winter 2008/2009): 41–52. 
7 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law California (Belmont, CA: 
Wadworth Thompson Learning, 2007), 245. 
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strength, and that of many of its allies, depends upon the U.S.’s ability to maintain 
freedom of the seas against those who wish to deny the U.S. access.  Understanding the 
threat piracy poses for security in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa requires 
knowledge of the different types of piracy, the responses by regional and extra-regional 
nations and the outcomes of those responses.  
1. Typology 
Pirates are criminals and, as such, use various means to achieve their goals. In 
1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) conducted a study that defined a 
pirate typology applicable to all locations.  These include: 1) low-level armed robbery: 
opportunistic attacks mounted close to land, 2) medium-level armed assault and robbery: 
piracy carried out further from shore, often in narrow sea-lanes, with a high probability 
that violence is used, and 3) major criminal attack: well-resourced and smoothly run 
operations in which violence is commonly employed, not only to steal money or cargo 
from a ship, but to take over the ship itself.8  Rupert Burns expanded on this further by 
providing a more in-depth description of where attacks occur in relation to the vessel’s 
location.  He expands the typology to include more detailed definitions: 1) simple 
robbery of ships stores and valuables from vessels at anchor/moored at a buoy/berthed 
alongside, 2) armed/violent robbery against vessels at anchor/moored at a buoy/berthed 
alongside, 3) armed/violent robbery against vessels underway or making way, 4) armed 
attacks against ships underway or making for purposes of hostage taking and ransom 
demand, and 5) deliberate vessel hijacking and devolution  “Phantom ship” operations.9  
The waters of Southeast Asia, which border the countries of Indonesia, Singapore 
and Malaysia, are congested and narrow, providing plenty of locations and opportunities 
for criminals to strike.  Several major sea-lanes in this region include the Strait of  
 
 
8 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International 
Security (New York, New York: Routledge, 2007), 31. 
9 Rupert Herbert Burns, “Compound Piracy at Sea in the Early Twenty-First Century: A Tactical to 
Operational-Level Perspective on Contemporary, Multiphase Piratical Methodology,” in Violence at Sea: 
Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (Routledge: New York, 2007), 98. 
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Malacca, measuring over 600 miles long.  This strait provides the link between the Indian 
Ocean and the South China Sea, and other important waterways, such as the Singapore, 
Lombok and the Sunda Straits.  
The members of pirate organizations who carry out attacks in this region include 
fisherman, common criminals, and even members of maritime security forces whose job 
is to protect shipping.10  Young and Valencia describe types of piracy in Southeast Asia, 
which encompass a “wide spectrum of criminal behavior ranging from in-port pilferage, 
to hit and run attacks, temporary seizure of the ship, to long-term seizure, and to 
permanent theft of the ship.”11  Joshua Ho writes from the perspective of Singapore when 
he describes three groups that commit piracy in Southeast Asia.  They are: (1) small 
criminals, (2) well-organized criminal gangs, and (3) armed separatists.12  He argues that 
criminal gangs and armed separatists are better equipped, organized and are more likely 
to use violence that includes the use of modern weapons and communications technology 
to achieve their goals.13  According to Caroline Liss, the majority of attacks in Southeast 
Asia are “hit and run attacks” carried out mostly inside territorial waters by two kinds of 
sea pirates: common sea robbers and social pirates.14  She breaks “common sea robbers” 
down further by classifying their level of organization and violence into “Asian Piracy,” 
which is associated with petty theft and robberies, and attacks more violent in nature, 
using guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), sometimes leading to murder.15  The 
end of the Cold War, increased globalization, greater trade, and profits made mariners 
and ships more vulnerable at a time when regional governments struggled to maintain 
control over the waterways.  In 2000, the actual and attempted attacks on shipping in  
 
 
10 Dana Robert Dillon, “Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade,” Heritage Foundation, 
June 22, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/research/asiathepacific/bg1379.cfm (accessed May 20, 2009). 
11 Adam J. Young and Mark Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (August 2003): 272. 
12 Joshua Ho, “Maritime Counter-Terrorism—A Singapore Perspective,” working paper, Institute of 
Defense and Strategic Studies Singapore (2004). 
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Carolin Liss, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia, “Southeast Asian Affairs (2003): 59.  
15 Ibid. 
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Southeast Asia reached a high of 469 reported attacks, followed by declining numbers in 
subsequent years.16  By the mid decade of the new millennium, maritime piracy in 
Southeast Asia had peaked and then began a steady decline.  
In contrast, hijackings and hostage-for-ransom situations that take place while the 
vessel is at sea characterize piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.  Even though 
violence is common, hijacked crews are more likely to survive the encounter because 
they are worth more alive than dead.  Similar to Southeast Asia, geography plays an 
important role in what type of piracy is most likely to be prevalent. The Gulf of Aden is 
an area that encompasses over 2.5 million square miles of ocean whose neighboring 
states include Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania.  Each year, over 20,000 
vessels pass through the Gulf of Aden, making it one of the most important waterways in 
the world, because it links the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez Canal.17  According 
to the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center, in 2008, there were 111 
incidents, with 42 vessels hijacked.  In 2009, there have been 29 successful attacks, out of 
114 attempted attacks. In the Gulf of Aden, there have been 71 attacks, of which 17 have 
been successful, indicating a significant increase in threats posed by piracy.18   
Representative of the skills acquired by Somali pirates was the hijacking of the 
Sirius Star in November 2008.  As long as an aircraft carrier, and loaded with crude oil 
worth 100 million dollars, Sirius Star was intercepted and captured 450 miles out to sea, 
stunning the world, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael 
Mullen.19  The tanker was subsequently taken to the territorial waters off Somali, where 
it remained until the ransom demands of the hijackers were met several months later.20  
This incident is unique for two reasons: size and range.  This was the first time that 
 
16 Liss, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 56. 
17 Congressional Research Service, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance (Washington, D.C., 
2009), http://www.assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40081_20090206.pdf (accessed June 10, 2009). 
18 ICC Commercial Crime Service, “Pirate Attacks off Somalia already Surpass 2008 Figures,” May 
20, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-
somalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (accessed May 20, 2009). 
19 Kraska and Wilson, “Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword,” 41–52. 
20 The Economist, “Ahoy there!; Somalia,” November 22, 2008, http://www.lexisnexis.com (accessed 
February 19, 2009).  
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pirates had successfully attacked a vessel of this size and had been the farthest attack 
from land at just over 400 miles.  It is only in the last few years that piracy in the Horn of 
Africa has replaced Southeast Asia as the world’s most piracy-prone area.  Stephanie 
Hanson writes in her article, Combating Maritime Piracy, that, in 2008, global maritime 
piracy had reached its highest levels since the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
began collecting statistics in 1992.  She attributes this rise to the incidence of piracy off 
the coast of East Africa that had risen 200%.21  
2. Causes 
Piracy exists because the opportunity for reward outweighs the potential risk. 
Martin Murphy writes that seven factors are common across all regions where piracy is 
active, including the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia.  These include: 1) legal and 
jurisdictional weakness, 2) favorable geography, 3) conflict and disorder, 4) underfunded 
law enforcement and lack of security, 5) permissive political environments, 6) cultural 
acceptability, and 7) the promise of reward.22 
3. Legal and Jurisdictional Weakness 
In both Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa, legal and jurisdictional problems 
minimize the risk pirate’s take each time they attempt to hijack a ship.  International law 
and the laws of nations regarding piracy are frequently incompatible, and thus, create 
legal obstacles that minimize accountability and provide the perception of weakness.  For 
example, in September 2008, the Danish flagship Absalon captured ten pirates suspected 
of attacking merchant ships off the coast of Africa but were forced to release them.23 
Danish laws only allow for prosecution if pirates attack Danish vessels.  In addition, 
evidentiary requirements could not be met for regional states to take action.  Peter Chalk  
 
 
21 Stephanie Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 27, 2009, 
1, http://www.cfr.org/publicion/18376/combating_maritime_piracy.html (accessed February 17, 2009).  
22 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International 
Security (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 13. 
23 Oliver Hawkins, “What to do with a Captured Pirate,” BBC News, March 10, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm/ (accessed March 24, 2009). 
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elaborates on this situation further when he writes, “Corruption and dysfunctional 
systems of national criminal justice have encouraged official complicity in high level 
pirate rings.”24 
4. Favorable Geography 
Both regions of the world—East Africa and Southeast Asia—have geographical 
conditions that put security forces at a disadvantage.  The Strait of Malacca, one of the 
world’s major chokepoints, is one of the busiest sea-lanes in the world.  The vast 
coastlines of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore provide numerous coves and inlets from 
which pirates can stage attacks and return quickly.  Each day, over 200 vessels transit 
through this region, carrying over 10 billion barrels of oil and tons of cargo, enticing 
pirates to test their skills and luck.25  
In contrast to the Strait of Malacca, Somalia occupies over 2,000 miles of 
coastline around the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, allowing pirates to extend their 
reach for hundreds of miles into the ocean.  When pirates return to shore, lawless 
conditions, encouraged by little or no security, have provided almost unlimited safe 
havens and supportive communities where pirates obtain supplies to execute attacks.  
5. Conflict and Disorder 
Piracy is a symptom of conflict and disorder that erupts on land when coastal 
regions have weak or failed governments.  The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and conflict 
in the Indonesian government contributed greatly to the spike in piracy in the late 1990s 
in Southeast Asia.  The diversion of funding and resources to other priorities weakens 
security, encourages corruption and provides criminals with weaknesses to exploit.  In 
Somalia, conflict and disorder, encouraged by the lack of security, forced local fisherman 
to protect their territorial waters from illegal fishing and vessels dumping waste. 
According to Peter Lehr, “The first pirate gangs emerged in the 1990s to protect against 
 
24 Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security (RAND Project Air Force Strategy 
and Doctrine Program, 2008), 13. 
25 Vijay Sakhuja, “Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global 
Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23.  
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foreign trawlers.”26  Over time, actions taken by fisherman to protect their territorial 
waters blossomed into a financial enterprise for warlords who demanded cash for the 
return of vessels and their crews.  
6. Underfunded Law Enforcement and Lack of Security 
Both regions suffered from underfunded law enforcement and lack of security. 
The failure to fund and train coast guards, navies and police allows pirates to operate 
freely.27  Fixing this problem can have significant effects on curbing piracy.  For 
example, in 1992, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore began to patrol the Malacca Strait 
aggressively, which resulted in the reduction of pirate activity. This effort was suspended 
after six months, however, due to cost.28  The attack of September 11 further exacerbated 
this by shifting funding from piracy to the war on terror.  In Somalia, lack of law 
enforcement caused piracy to grow even worse.  Peter Lehr writes that the Somali Navy 
at one time had several versions of armed patrol craft—given to them by the Soviet 
Union—capable of patrolling the coastline and waterways.29  By the early 1990s, the 
vessels fell into disrepair, providing little or no security to monitor the resource-rich 
ocean in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  This contributed to the current 
piracy problem by allowing foreign nations to plunder fish stocks. 
7. Permissive Political Environments 
Weak governments encourage lax law enforcement.  In countries with permissive 
political environments, resources to combat piracy are scarce.  This encourages 
corruption, increases crime, and draws attention to areas where security is weak and 
targets are plentiful, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Horn of Africa.  This can  
 
 
26 Ishaan Tharoor, “How Somalia’s Fisherman Became Pirates,” Time, April 18, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time (accessed May 20, 2009). 
27 Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, 15. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Peter Lehr, Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (Routledge: New York, 2007), 
12. 
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further erode the stability of surrounding nations.  Somalia, Kenya, Yemen, Sudan and 
Indonesia have all had political problems and are examples of states that have had 
problems with countering piracy.  
8. Cultural Acceptability 
Piracy is most likely to take hold in regions that have a maritime tradition.  Martin 
Murphy suggests that regions that have established trading patterns, such as Southeast 
Asia and West Africa, are more likely to resort to piracy because of cultural reasons 
passed on from generation to generation.30  The large volume of ship traffic that passes 
through the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia provides an inviting target for those with 
seafaring skills to operate at sea.  
9. Promise of Reward 
The promise of reward encourages piracy.  In both regions, piracy has become a 
lucrative business.  In the Strait of Malacca, where robberies are frequent, pirates steal 
almost anything of value and go to great lengths to do so.  Examples include pirates 
taking jewelry, TVs and DVD players, to robbing and murdering the crew, and then 
selling the ship and its cargo.  Off the coast of Somalia in January 2009, several pirates 
drowned when their boat overturned on its way back to shore after receiving a three 
million dollar ransom for the return of the Sirius Star and its crew.  Until the risks 
outweigh the reward, piracy will continue to be difficult to stop. 
10. Response 
Addressing the underlying causes of piracy has required nations to respond in 
different ways to combat piracy.  In Southeast Asia, the closeness of strait nations to one 
another has heightened sensitivities to state sovereignty.  These sensitivities have made 
the principle of non-intervention the “bedrock of intraregional state relations and have 
 
30 Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, 17. 
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become the single most inhibitor of maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia.”31  The 
ability to understand and respond to these issues has required regional and extra-regional 
responses to ensure cooperation amongst the various nations.  Joshua Ho writes that 
individual efforts, regional cooperation, bilateral and multilateral measures between the 
straits nations of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia has had an impact on lessening the 
effects of piracy in the Strait of Malacca.   
Examples of individual efforts include Indonesia’s push in 2003 to modernize the 
Navy’s platforms, which encouraged an emphasis on coastal interdiction and increasing 
patrols. 32 Also, in 2005, Indonesian president Yudhoyono increased naval patrols in 
waters near the Strait of Malacca, in addition to increased intelligence operations in 
coastal regions.33  Malaysia constructed radar tracking stations in the Strait of Malacca to 
track ship traffic, and Singapore increased its maritime patrols.34  John Bradford notes 
that the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in 2004 began a series of 
trilateral coordinated maritime patrols called the Maritime Straits Sea Patrols.35  These 
were further augmented in 2005 with coordinated airborne surveillance under the terms 
of the “Eyes in the Sky” agreement.36  This cooperation has further expanded to include 
extra-regional states that rely upon trade routes passing through Southeast Asian waters. 
Countries, such as the United States, India and Japan, have assisted in capacity building 
programs and assistance.  In 2001, Japan proposed the creation of a regional cooperation 
agreement called ReCAAP or Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery in Asia to encourage cooperation and information sharing amongst 
Asian states.  It was the first successful intergovernmental organization whose mission 
was to combat piracy, culminating in 2006 with the opening of the Information Sharing 
 
31 John F. Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 
Naval War College Review 58, no .3 (Summer 2005): 73. 
32 Ho, “The Security of Regional Sea Lanes.” 
33 Ian Storey, “Calming the Waters in Maritime Southeast Asia,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 29 
(February 2009): http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb029.pdf (accessed June 5, 2009). 
34 Ho, “The Security of Regional Sea Lanes,” 11. 
35 John F. Bradford, “Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters,” Asian Survey 48, 
no. 3 (May/June 2008): 482. 
36 Ibid. 
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Center in Singapore.37  The United States has also taken steps towards cooperation by 
participating in regional exercises that emphasize maritime cooperation, such as the 
Cooperation and Readiness Afloat (CARAT) exercise that partner the U.S. military with 
nations, such as Brunei, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia.38  The overall 
outcome has been the increased cooperation between nations and an overall reduction in 
pirate attacks in Southeast Asia. 
Similar to Southeast Asia, the lack of state control, resources, economic distress 
and endemic corruption in Somalia and regional states has allowed piracy to thrive and 
has complicated efforts by the United States and coalition nations to combat it.  Regional 
governments in the region have taken action to curtail piracy by adopting a code of 
conduct similar to ReCAPP proposed by Japan in 2001.  Called the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, it facilitates the 
cooperation of member states in efforts, such as the apprehension and prosecution of 
suspected pirates, information sharing and ship rider programs.  Of the 21 countries that 
attended the convention, nine nations signed the agreement in January 2009, including 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen.39  
In December 2008, the National Security Council released its approach to combat 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden titled, “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership 
& Action Plan.”  The objective of the plan was to focus on immediate short-term 
measures aimed at preventing, disrupting and punishing acts of piracy by Somali pirate 
organizations through law enforcement means that support long-term initiatives aimed at 
stabilizing Somalia.40  In 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced new 
counter-piracy initiatives to broaden U.S. strategy in the region that includes increased 
cooperation, expanding multinational cooperation, bilateral meetings with the Somali 
 
37 Bradford, “Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters,” 484. 
38 Ibid., 485. 
39 International Maritime Organization, “High-level Meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of Conduct to 
Repress Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,” http://www.imo.org/ (accessed February 20, 
2009). 
40 U.S. National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action 
Plan, Washington, DC, 2008.  
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Transitional Federal Government and working with the shipping industry to increase 
awareness of best practices.41  Current U.S. strategy includes the creation of an anti-
piracy taskforce, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), conducting legal agreements 
with regional nations and cooperating with other nations to combat piracy effectively.  
In response to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) requesting 
greater international cooperation, NATO, European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR), 
the United States and other maritime nations have contributed ships and aircraft to the 
anti-piracy patrol.  In May 2009, 28 nations and six international organizations met in 
New York to participate in the contact group on piracy whose goals were to promote 
increased, coordination and awareness.  To facilitate cooperation amongst nations, four 
working groups were created to address concerns that include military and operational 
coordination, information sharing, capacity building, judicial issues, commercial industry 
coordination and public information.42  
United States and coalition responses to piracy lie in the belief that piracy is an 
international problem that requires an international solution.  Since coalition operations 
are primarily using law enforcement mechanisms, they are forced to rely upon 
international law and individual states laws to combat piracy.  This includes observing 
strict rules of evidence for prosecuting pirates. Problems in enforcement occur because of 
the lack of a coherent unified strategy brought about by separate chains of command and 
diverse national strategic goals.  
The umbrella of legitimacy that covers all forces combating piracy is the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 101 sets forth the 




41 U.S. Department of State, Announcement of Counter-Piracy Initiatives, April 15, 2009, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121758.htm (accessed June 6, 2009).  
42 America.gov, “Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,” May 18, 2009, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/May/20090518175245xjsnommis0.5672266.html. 
(accessed June 6, 2009). 
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Piracy consists of the following acts: 
(A) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or private aircraft, and directed: 
1. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
2. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state; 
3. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 
or aircraft; 
4. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in sub paragraph (a) or (b).43 
Since UNCLOS defines acts that occur on the high seas and not inside the 
territorial waters of a nation, this has produced constraints that hamper law enforcement 
action against pirates.  The IMB definition closes the gap by defining piracy as, “An act 
of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other 
crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”44  This 
provides further protections beyond UNCLOS to maritime states whose territorial waters 
are in close proximity to each other. 
To combat piracy, the United Nations (UN) has authorized United Nations 
Security Council resolutions 1816, 1846 and 1851 on behalf of member states.  These 
authorize progressive actions by states to intervene on both land and sea using force for a 
period not to exceed one year.  Although theses resolutions provide legal protection for 
nations, they do not provide incentives for nations to act, which limits their effectiveness. 




43 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: 
United Nations, 1983), 34. 
44 Young and Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” 
270. 
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adjudication of suspects.  The only countries that have agreements are the United States, 
United Kingdom and Kenya. To be effective and to reduce the burden on Kenya, more 
countries need to participate.  
In conclusion, the causes of piracy can be found on land and will require a land-
based solution to combat.  Responses by regional and extra-regional governments so far 
have included actions taken on land and at sea with varying levels of success.  Current 
literature suggests that the answer to piracy in the Horn of Africa will come from 
solutions that incorporate Somalia and the surrounding states, in addition to international 
assistance.  Addressing root causes of piracy, in addition to reducing the impact of 
attacks, can help achieve a lasting, economic, political and security arrangement that 
reduces the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The basic methodological approach used in this thesis is a comparative case study 
of piracy that includes Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa.  Comparing contemporary 
cases of piracy in Southeast Asia and the approaches used by regional and international 
states to combat piracy can successfully provide lessons learned for the current piracy 
crisis.  The primary sources include books, journal and magazine articles, as well as in-
depth analysis of statistics published by the IMB and other relevant organizations.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In the Horn of Africa, state failure poses severe challenges to nations in their 
efforts to curb piracy.  The topic of research is to analyze critically why the United States 
and other maritime nations have been ineffectual in their efforts to stop piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden. The major research question asks what measures are most effective to combat 






The second chapter examines the different types, causal factors, responses and 
outcomes regarding piracy in Southeast Asia since the mid-1990s to present day.  Chapter 
III examines the same types, causal factors, responses and outcomes regarding piracy in 
the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden from the mid-1990s to present day.  The final 
chapter summarizes the findings and identifies implications for U.S. policy towards 
piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden. 
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II. PIRACY AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly addresses the historical background of piracy in Southeast 
Asia and then examines the decade-long wave of piracy that began in that region during 
the mid-1990s.  It begins by analyzing the different types of piracy that were common 
during that period, as well as the causal factors that underlie piracy, the response to 
piracy by regional and extra-regional states, and the eventual outcomes of their actions. 
The Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia and lesser known straits, such as the 
Sumba, Lombok, Luzon, Singapore and Makassar Straits, have long been considered 
critical sea lines of communication that have strategically linked this region to the Middle 
East and North Asia.  Despite denials by Southeast Asian governments, for years the 
Strait of Malacca has been a well-known piracy hotspot.45  According to the IMB, in 
2000, piracy in Southeast Asia peaked with 260 actual and attempted attacks on merchant 
shipping.46  In response to the increase in piracy, in 2005, the Joint War Committee 
(JWC) of Lloyds Market Association declared the Strait of Malacca a high-risk zone 
because of the danger to shipping and their crews by pirates.47  In the past, pirates have 
operated within seams created by economic and political disorder that has affected many 
Southeast Asia nations.  What began as petty theft and banditry in the mid-1990s, turned 
into a full-blown threat to the security and prosperity of Southeast Asia and other nations 
that rely on the straits for commerce and transportation.  Despite some governments’ 
tendencies to downplay the piracy threat, Southeast Asian countries took strong actions to 
respond to and curtail piracy over the past few years.  These were effective and have been 
 
45 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,” in The Best of Times, The 
Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond 
(Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005), 61. 
46 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report, 
(United Kingdom, January 1–December 31, 2005), 5.  
47 Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, “Piracy in Maritime Asia,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of 
Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr, (Routledge, 2007), 81. 
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called the “Asian model” of counter-piracy operations.48  In 2008, the IMB reported that 
there were 65 actual and attempted attacks for all of Southeast Asia.49  In comparison, 
the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden recorded 114 attacks.50  Lessons learned from this 
model can provide insight into effective means of combating the contemporary threat of 
piracy in the Horn of Africa.  
B. HISTORY OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Piracy has a long history in Southeast Asia, documented as early as the 14th 
century, when Chinese writer Lung-Ya Min described the Strait of Malacca as the 
“Dragon-teeth strait.” 
The inhabitants [of this area] are addicted to piracy. When [Chinese Junks] 
sail to the Western [Indian] Ocean the local barbarians allow them to pass 
unmolested but when on their return the junks reach Chi-li-men [the 
Karimun Islands, at the junction of the Malacca and Singapore Straits] the 
sailors prepare their armor and padded screens as a protection against 
arrows for, of a certainty, some two or three hundred pirate praus will put 
out to attack them for several days. Sometimes [the junks] are fortunate 
enough to escape with a favorable wind; otherwise the crews are 
butchered and the merchandise made off with in quick time.51 
For over 2,000 years, the confined waterways, coves and inlets of the straits 
region have provided sanctuary to those ready and willing to attack vessels passing 
through Asian waters.  According to Donald Freeman, the ascendency of piracy in the 
Strait of Malacca and surrounding regions began in the 19th century for several reasons. 
These include the lucrative spice trade in the East Indies between Europe and China, the 
opening of Japan to Western society, the industrial demand for rubber and tin, and the 
increased number of vessels transiting through the Strait of Malacca.52  Piracy was a 
 
48 Commander James Kraska, “Fresh Thinking for an Old Problem,” Naval War College Review 62, 
no. 4 (Autumn 2009), 147. 
49 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report 
(United Kingdom, January 1–December 31, 2008), 5.  
50 Ibid., 5. 
51 P. Wheatley, “The Golden Khersonese,” in The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet, ed. 
Donald B. Freeman (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 175. 
52 Ibid., 178. 
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dangerous business, and ships passing through this region often faced a gauntlet of 
pirates, such as the “Malays of Johore and Riau-Lingaa; the Bugis, the Brunei Malays 
and the Dayak; the Iranuns and the Balangingi.”53  The most feared of all were the Iranun 
and Balaningi who originated out of the southern Philippines and Borneo.54  
European sea traders, such as the Portuguese, Dutch and later the British, 
established a significant presence in Southeast Asia, operating trading companies, such as 
the East India Trading Company and the Dutch United East India Company between 
1500–1800.  Efforts by traders to defend themselves from pirates were often ineffectual 
because they lacked resources and the proper technology to deal with the threat.  For 
example, typical 19th century Malay pirate fleets were comprised of praus or small boats 
that were well armed and powered by slaves rowing with double-banked oars.55  Trading 
vessels were no match for their maneuverability and speed because they were dependent 
on the wind for speed.  In 1835, the British responded to European merchants’ pleas for 
help by sending a British sloop, the HMS Wolf, with orders to combat piracy.56  Despite 
being heavily armed, the ship’s presence was largely ineffective because of its deep draft 
and reliance on wind for propulsion.  These limitations ensured that the HMS Wolf and 
similar vessels found it difficult to navigate fast-moving currents and treacherous entries 
into numerous inlets and coves that lined the region.57  The invention of steam-powered 
ships in the 1830s would finally provide the British the upper hand in speed and mobility 
when chasing pirate praus.  This enabled them to destroy pirate ships and their bases of 
operation, pushing them further away from European ships to prey on slower and more 
vulnerable vessels.  
In the latter half of the 20th century, piracy again attracted international attention 
in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, when thousands of refugees fleeing the communists 
 
53 Xu Ke, “Piracy, Seaborne Trade and the Rivalries of Foreign Sea Powers in East and Southeast 
Asia, 1511 to 1839: A Chinese Perspective,” Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca 
Straits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 229. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet, 180. 
56 Ibid., 183. 
57 Ibid. 
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took to the sea in boats of all sizes.  Commonly known as “boat people,” their ships were 
often overloaded, making them easy prey for pirates operating in the Gulf of Thailand 
and South China Sea.58 
C. TYPES OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
What makes piracy distinct in Southeast Asia, and the straits region in particular, 
is the different variations of piracy that can occur.  It can range anywhere from the petty 
theft of valuables using little or no force, to the hijacking of a ship and the death of its 
crew.  The reason for these differences is based on how UNCLOS and the IMB define 
piracy.  UNCLOS takes a narrow approach that limits what acts can be called piracy, 
based on location, such as the twelve-mile territorial limit.  The IMB has a broader view 
that incorporates regional trends and differences, such as attacks in port or at anchor. In 
1993, the IMO classified piracy into three categories in an effort to educate the maritime 
community and provide guidance on piracy. 
 Low Level Assault of Armed robbery. Generally executed from land or at 
anchor. Characterized by little or no violence. 
 Medium-Level Armed Assault and Robbery.  Executed by people who are 
more organized. Attacks can happen from land or come from the sea. 
 Major Criminal Hijackings. Involve violence that often times leads to the 
death of crews and hijacking of a ship and its cargo for money.59 
This general classification did not account for the unique aspects of piracy in 
Southeast Asia.  The author has chosen to follow the example used by Caroline Liss 
because it clarifies the three categories further by dividing pirates into two groups: (1) 
opportunistic sea-robbers, who conduct small-scale attacks lasting a short amount of 
time, and (2) organized pirate gangs that conduct hijackings and other kinds of attacks.60  
 
58 Tamara Renee Shie, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-
ASEAN Cooperation,” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham 
Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 170. 
59 Sakhuja, “Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, 
24. 
60 Caroline Liss, “The Roots of Piracy in Southeast Asia,” Austral Policy Forum 07-18A, October 22, 
2007, http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/the-roots-of-piracy-in-
southeast-asia/ (accessed September 25, 2009). 
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1. Opportunistic Sea Robbers 
Attacks by this group usually consist of “hit and run” robberies whose goal is to 
loot as much as possible before detection.  According to Adam Young and Mark 
Valencia, “criminals sneak aboard ships, generally at night, and steal what they can 
immediately lay their hands on like cash and electronic equipment.”61  These attacks 
usually last no longer than 15–30 minutes and require little planning.62  Increasingly 
dangerous are temporary or short-term seizures that require prior intelligence, better 
organization, and skills, such as boarding moving ships at night using grappling hooks, 
ladders and automatic weapons.  This also requires more personnel to control the crew of 
a vessel, increasing the risk to both crew and the pirate.63 
2. Organized Pirate Gangs 
Attacks conducted by these groups are considerably more organized and violent. 
They cover the spectrum of attacks on shipping that includes medium-sized vessels, such 
as cargo ships, tankers and bulk carriers.  These are often long-term or permanent 
seizures.64  Long-term seizures include the hijacking of a ship while at sea, the detention 
of the crew and the offloading of cargo for sale.  Permanent seizures often include killing 
the crew, offloading the cargo and changing the registry of the vessel for use or sale in 
another country.  Commonly known as a “phantom ship,” this permits pirates to continue 
using the vessel long after it has been reported missing.65  An example of this type of 
attack was the hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow in 1999 while it transiting through 
Indonesian waters.  Pirates boarded the ship and held the crew hostage for a week before 
setting them adrift in a life raft, later to be picked up by a passing ship.  The vessel was 
 
61 Young and Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” 
272. 
62 Liss, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 59. 
63 Young and Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” 
272. 
64 Liss, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 62. 
65 Ibid., 63.  
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later found and detained in Indian waters after it was renamed the Mega Rama.66  As 
piracy continued to surge, pirate tactics evolved further by hijacking ships for the sole 
purpose of ransoming the crew for cash. 
D. CAUSES OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
At its most basic level, piracy is an act executed for economic gain.  What has 
driven people in Southeast Asia to embrace piracy as a way of life is often varied and 
complex.  The key to minimizing the threat requires understanding the underlying factors 
behind it.  For this paper, the author uses the structure put forward by Martin Murphy 
because it provides a comprehensive framework that closely addresses factors related to 
piracy regardless of region.  These include: 1) legal and jurisdictional weaknesses, 2) 
favorable geography, 3) conflict and disorder, 4) underfunded law enforcement, 5) 
permissive political environments, 6) cultural acceptability and 7) the promise of reward.  
1.  Legal and Jurisdictional Weakness  
One reason why the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia failed to 
acknowledge they had a piracy problem was due to how it was defined in international 
law.  UNCLOS, created during the Cold War, defines piracy as “any acts of violence, 
detention or depredation committed for private ends on the high seas.”67  In the Strait of 
Malacca and surrounding regions, this is significant because of the unique geographical 
confines of the straits, in particular, the lower one-third where territorial boundaries often 
overlap.  This encouraged littoral states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, to treat piracy 
as an internal state problem rather than a growing transnational threat to fisherman and 
vessels transiting through the straits.  
Within a regional context, jurisdictional issues and disagreements between 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia over the safety and security of the straits facilitated 
their collective inability to act, contributing to the rise in piracy.  J. N. Mak notes, “the 
 
66 Young and Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” 
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67 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: 
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overarching problem was the clash of interests between the key littoral states of Malaysia 
and Indonesia, which are coastal states with coastal interests on the one hand and 
international users on the other.”68  Singapore’s location near the straits makes it a littoral 
state, but its interests, perceptions and reliance on international maritime traffic make it 
more likely to adopt the views of the user-states over those of its regional neighbors.69  
Disagreements between the strait nations over sovereignty issues were problematic as 
well.  As former colonial possessions, Malaysia, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent 
Singapore, have been sensitive to issues involving sovereignty because of their history of 
exploitation.  This has made them sensitive towards outside interference in their 
territorial waters, which has often inhibited the cooperation and information-sharing 
necessary to combat piracy. 
2.  Favorable Geography  
Geography is a significant factor that must be accounted for when piracy is 
discussed.  The Strait of Malacca has long been one of the main shipping routes between 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans and has been a source of economic, strategic and political 
importance to regional and international states.  A little over 600 miles long, the strait 
shares a common border between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  At its narrowest 
point, the strait measures just 1.5 miles wide and is draft-limited to 72 feet.70  Along the 
coast, numerous coves, inlets, waterways, sandbars and reefs provide hideouts and easy 
access to escape, once an attack is complete.  The sheer size of the region also makes 
combating piracy a difficult task.  For example, Indonesia claims “81,000 km of 
coastline, 3 million sq km of territorial waters and an additional 3.1 million square km in 
their Economic Exclusion Zone or EEZ.”71  The shape of the strait plays a role as well, 
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funneling ships through constricted sea-lanes, providing a predictable route for pirates to 
attack.  Half of the world’s seaborne trade and oil supplies flow through this 
chokepoint.72  According to Tamara Shie, “Six of the top twenty-five container ports in 
the world are located in Southeast Asia: Singapore, Port Kelang (Malaysia), Tanjung 
Priok (Indonesia), Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia), Laem Chabang (Thailand), and Manila 
(the Philippines).”73  The size of vessels transiting through this region varies from small 
yachts to the largest ships in the world, such as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and 
Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC).  Their size and predictable course provide easy 
targets for determined criminals and pirates.  Lastly, the lack of hot pursuit agreements 
between the littoral states has allowed fleeing pirates to cross borders at will, allowing 
them to escape detention and arrest.  
3.  Conflict and Disorder  
The end of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
represented a fundamental change in the security and stability of the region.  It signaled 
the retreat of American and Russian influence and a corresponding reduction in their 
naval presence.  This left Southeast Asian nations responsible for their own security. 
However, many of them were unprepared to provide security to ships at sea and in port, 
creating gaps that pirates were able to exploit.  Exacerbating this further was a weakened 
Suharto government in Indonesia.  Unable to exert state influence in the farthest regions 
of Indonesia, rebel groups, such as the Free Aceh Movement or GAM were able to grow, 
requiring additional resources to combat at the expense of security concerns in the Strait 
of Malacca.  The Asian financial crisis in 1997 caused considerable economic instability 
throughout the region, leading to widespread unemployment and poverty.  In 1998, the 
gross domestic product (GDP) for Indonesia contracted 14% while inflation shot up to 
80%.74  As a result of the instability, President Suharto resigned in May 1998.  
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Globalization, and the interconnected nature of world economies and their reliance on 
shipping to move products, ensured greater numbers of vessels would need to transit 
through the Malacca Strait.  Increased numbers of ships meant an increase in potential 
targets for pirates to attack.  
4.  Underfunded Law Enforcement and Lack of Security  
Inadequate funding and training for police and maritime security forces allows 
pirates to operate freely because they do not have the capabilities to deter or prevent 
pirates from attacking ships.  Patrolling waterways requires large number of boats, 
personnel and technology.  Support from shore-based facilities is also needed to provide 
intelligence on the movement of ships and pirates.75  
The Asian financial crisis had a profound impact on the lack of funding for 
security and law enforcement activities of nations in Southeast Asia.  Indonesia was hit 
particularly hard with massive unemployment and poverty that affected the general 
welfare of Indonesians.76  The country’s defense budget declined by 65% from 1997 to 
1998, limiting expenditures on its maritime security force tasked with patrolling 
Indonesian waters, providing more opportunities for pirates to strike.77  Furthermore, the 
government budget supplied no more than 30% of military expenditures, which required 
soldiers to find alternative methods to support their families and upgrade equipment and 
facilities.78  This encouraged members of the military to find other ways to augment their 
incomes, such as bribes, extortion and piracy.  
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5.  Permissive Political Environments  
At the same time as the Asian financial crisis, the Suharto regime in Indonesia 
was undergoing a period of instability.  In the province of Aceh, near the Strait of 
Malacca, unrest required resources and money that otherwise could have been used to 
fight piracy.  Banlaoi argues that one of the reasons for lax security has been the political 
instability and weak governmental institutions of Indonesia and the Philippines that 
helped contribute to the rise of piracy.79  Corruption was another factor that encouraged 
permissive political environments.  According to Young, corruption is widespread 
throughout Southeast Asia, including the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia.80  To 
operate effectively, pirates need safe places to sell their goods.  This requires the support 
and cooperation from people on land, such as harbormasters, local police, bureaucrats 
and even the military.81  It has been documented that members of the Indonesian military 
have attacked vessels.  For example, in 1992, John Burnett, the author of Dangerous 
Waters, Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, was beaten and robbed while 
transiting waters near Singapore at night on his yacht.  He believed the three men who 
attacked him were in the Indonesian military 82 
6.  Cultural Acceptability  
According to Martin Murphy, piracy thrives where it is culturally acceptable.  In 
regions that have a long history of seaborne trade, such as Southeast Asia, piracy has 
become a tradition that has made it a permanent feature of the environment and a 
culturally acceptable way of life.83  In tough times, it has provided a secondary means of 
providing support for local villages.  Banlaoi argues that the economic impact of the 
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Asian financial crisis amplified poverty, which caused some people to “return to the old 
ways of finding a living,” which included using piracy as an alternate source of income.84 
7.  Promise of Reward 
The relatively low risk of capture or incarceration is offset by the promise of 
reward for pirates who attempt to either rob or hijack ships.  Large ships limited by speed 
and draft, moving in a predictable direction, provide a tempting target for fisherman 
looking to augment their income or criminals intent on their next score.  Catherine 
Raymond notes that in the Malacca Strait, ransom demands can range from $100,000 to 
$200,000, although hijackers often settle for considerably less, “somewhere between ten 
and twenty thousand dollars.”85  In areas where poverty is prevalent, even this reduced 
sum is a significant amount of money for most people in this region.  
E.  RESPONSES TO THE RISE OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The response to piracy in Southeast Asia has required a concerted effort on behalf 
of the littoral states, their neighbors and the international community.  IMB statistics 
shows that the number of pirate attacks have been steadily declining over the last few 
years.86  Several events transpired to focus attention on this region. This includes the 
record number of attacks in 2000; the September 11 attacks on the United States, and the 
Joint War Committee of the London Marine Insurance Market listing the Malacca Strait 
as a war risk, raising insurance premiums.87  Throughout this period, national, bilateral, 
multilateral and extra-regional actions taken by states collectively acted to reduce piracy. 
One of the earliest responses to piracy was the creation of the Piracy Reporting 
Center in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia.  In the early 1990s, as the frequency of successful 
pirate attacks was increasing, there were no formal mechanisms to collect and 
 
84 Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,” in The Best of Times, The Worst of 
Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, 63.  
85 Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait,” 34.  
86 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report 
(United Kingdom, January 1–December 31, 2008), 5. 
87 David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating 
Coastal and User State Priorities,” Ocean Development and International Law 39, no. 1 (2008): 60. 
 30
                                                
disseminate information to mariners, shipping companies and states trying to combat 
piracy.  The focus of the Piracy Reporting Center was to provide a means for mariners to 
report attacks and suspicious movements of vessels, and to start the response process and 
gather statistical data.88  Their efforts helped raise the profile of piracy by working 
closely with governments, insurance providers and shipping companies, while providing 
much-needed publicity to spur nations into action.  
1.  National Efforts 
Prior to the September 11 attacks on the United States, littoral states pursued 
national and bilateral security arrangements rather than multilateral efforts for several 
reasons.  First, Malaysia and Indonesia, whose borders occupy a significant portion of the 
straits, have resisted any perceived lessening of its sovereignty in its territorial waters, 
making efforts at cooperation difficult.  Second, Indonesia and Malaysia viewed piracy as 
a domestic rather than a regional problem, allowing them to ignore initiatives aimed at 
securing the waterway.  Third, Southeast Asian terrorist and separatist groups, such as the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and GAM, were perceived as movements that threatened 
individual states that required a unilateral rather than a multilateral response.89  
According to Anthony Massey, “there was little pressure given to maritime security in the 
Strait of Malacca region in general prior to 9/11 that would give these states an incentive 
to pursue multilateral levels of cooperation.”90  Despite these issues, national measures 
taken by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore before and after the September 11 attacks 
have played a significant role in the reduction of piracy in the region. 
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a. Indonesia 
Ian Storey writes “between 2000 and 2006 a quarter of global piracy 
incidents, and two-thirds of those in Southeast Asia, occurred in Indonesian waters.”91  A 
significant reason for this was the economic and political impact of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 that weakened the Indonesian government and military.92  Table 1 
illustrates this by showing that the rise of piracy in Indonesian waters coincided with a 
weakened Indonesian government.  By 2004, as the political and economic situation 
improved, the Indonesian government took steps that caused piracy to decline.  The most 
important was the Indonesian government’s recognition that a problem with piracy 
existed.  Wary of international pressure, the Indonesian government implemented several 
unilateral actions, which demonstrated its resolve at reducing piracy in their region.  For 
example, the Indonesian Navy responded by pursuing reforms and modernization, with 
an emphasis on coastal interdiction.93  In 2004, command and control centers were 
established in Bantam in the Riau islands and Belawan in Northern Sumatra to increase 
response times.94  In 2005, President Yudhoyono ordered an increase in naval patrols and 
intelligence-gathering operations in waters next to the Malacca Strait to provide 
security.95  That same year, the Indonesian government launched Operation GURITA, a 
show of force in waters frequented by pirates that involved over 20 ships and aircraft.96  
Underscoring Indonesia’s commitment was the implementation of programs that 
addressed poverty and the welfare of people in remote areas of the country.97  For 
example, North of Tanjung Balai off the coast of Sumatra, “some villages and dens of 
pirates have now been reconnected with the economic and administrative centers through 
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new infrastructures, such as sewers and wider asphalt roads.”98  According to Sam 
Bateman, “official and community attitudes against piracy in Indonesia have hardened in 
recent years.” 99  This has played a key role in reducing piracy and armed robbery in the 
Malacca strait. 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
47 60 115 119 91 103 121 94 79 50 43 3 
Table 1.   Piracy Incidents in Indonesia by Year100 
IMB piracy data corroborate efforts taken by Indonesia and show a 
corresponding reduction in incidents of pirate attacks.  For example, the IMBs record of 
attempted and actual attacks within Indonesian waters steadily declined: 121 attacks in 
2003, 94 in 2004, 79 in 2005, and 50 in 2006.   
b. Malaysia 
The Malaysian response included the establishment of an anti-piracy task 
force in 2000 by the Royal Malaysian Police Force.  They added 20 strike craft and rigid 
inflatable boats, and began construction of several radar tracking sites used to monitor the 
flow of traffic in the straits.101  In 2005, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
(MMEA) was created from existing agencies to form the equivalent of a coast guard able 
to patrol Malaysian waters. 
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c. Singapore 
Of the three littoral governments, Singapore is the most dependent on 
trade that flows through the straits, and has taken corresponding steps to increase capacity 
and security.  This includes the implementation of an integrated surveillance and tracking 
network and randomly escorting high-value merchant vessels in their waters.102  In 2004, 
Singapore also signed the 1988 Rome convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), prompted by the hijacking 
of the Achille Lauro to increase legal options to prosecute pirates. 
2.  Bilateral Efforts 
In addition to national measures, since the early 1990s, the littoral states have 
made some efforts to work together to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea.  In 1992, 
Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to provide anti-piracy patrols with an emphasis on 
coordination and communication-sharing capacity, laying groundwork for future 
operations.103  They also established a Maritime Operations Planning Team to coordinate 
patrols in the straits.104  In 2005, Indonesia and Singapore launched project SURPIC, a 
real-time surveillance system to monitor traffic in the Singapore Straits to facilitate 
cooperation and the best use of patrol assets.105  
Besides the littoral states, regional nations have participated by conducting patrols 
and exercises in the region.  For example, in September 2004, India and Indonesia 
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Nicobar Islands and Indonesia’s Aceh province.  In 2003, Malaysia and Thailand 
increased maritime patrols along the Malaysia-Thai border because of concerns over 
“arms smugglers, insurgents and terrorists operating in the area.”106 
Despite national and bilateral efforts by the littoral states to combat piracy, it 
became apparent that regional cooperative mechanisms would be needed. The 
transnational nature of piracy and the emphasis placed on sovereignty by Indonesia and 
Malaysia presented jurisdictional challenges to anti-piracy forces as they attempted to 
pursue and punish pirates.  Without effective and lasting regional cooperation, pirates 
will continue to exploit jurisdictional weaknesses.107  
3.  Regional Efforts 
Regional efforts that emphasized operational actions have marked a major step 
forward in maritime security cooperation and have played an important role in reducing 
the number of attacks in the straits.  One of their first joint efforts was the implementation 
of STRAITREP in 1998 by the IMO, a joint Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore ship 
reporting system that emphasized information sharing and cooperation amongst straits 
nations.108  After the September 11 attacks, the attitude of littoral governments towards 
security in the straits changed as the relevance of non-traditional crimes, such as armed 
robbery and piracy began to be viewed by the United States and other maritime nations as 
a security concern.  Increased levels of violence used by pirates against larger vessels led 
some observers to conclude that a connection between piracy and terrorism existed.  In 
May 2004, Dr. Tony Tan, the deputy prime minister and coordinating minister for 
security in Singapore, stated that, “the possible nexus between piracy and maritime 
terrorism is probably the greatest concern to maritime security.”109  The example he used 
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to highlight the tenuous linkages between piracy and terrorism is the 2003 hijacking of 
the MV Dewi Madrim in the Malacca Strait.  According to Martin Murphy, the report of 
this incident originated from the Aegis Defense Services and concluded that the pirates 
who boarded the ship exhibited behavior similar to terrorists.110  While on board, it was 
reported that they took control of the ship and attempted to gain ship-handling experience 
before they left, drawing comparisons with the 9/11 hijackers gaining flight experience 
prior to the attack.111  Even though these events were later disputed by the owner of the 
ship and other agencies, linkages between pirates and terrorists has remained.  Peter 
Chalk writes, “to date there has been no credible evidence to support speculation about 
this nexus.  Moreover the objectives of the two actors remain entirely distinct.”112  
Concerns over the Regional Maritime Security Initiative proposed by the United 
States, which included possible intervention by the United States, prompted Malaysia, 
Indonesia and later Singapore in 2004 to agree to trilateral coordinated surface patrols 
called the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols (MALSINDO).  These patrols consisted of 
numerous ships from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore with the goal of reducing piracy 
and smuggling activities by conducting coordinated patrols in the waters of participating 
nations.  The name was later changed to the Malacca Strait Patrol.  Thailand began 
participating in 2008.   
In 2005, joint air patrols were added to strengthen regional efforts under the Eyes 
in the Sky (EIS) plan to increase coverage and response times to surface forces.113  
According to Pottengal Mukundan, director of the IMB, coordinated patrols between the 
littoral states had an enormous impact on the decline of piracy, because “the pirates could 
no longer jump from one country’s jurisdiction to the other, leaving a pursuing vessel 
behind, the navy of the next jurisdiction was waiting.  The result was that the strait was 
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being diligently patrolled from all sides.”114  Despite attempts at operationalizing 
cooperative mechanisms, there have been disagreements about their effectiveness.  
Bateman writes that “cooperation between and among littoral countries is still rather less 
than ideal: the coordinated air surveillance is infrequent; the surface patrols are 
coordinated rather than joint; and there are restrictions on the hot pursuit of suspicious 
vessels into the territorial sea of another country.”115  
In the mid-1990s, regional initiatives supported by the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, (ASEAN), began to contribute to information and cooperative sharing 
mechanisms that focused attention on the need to combat piracy.  Formed in 1967 by 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, ASEAN’s early years were 
marked by efforts to protect national interests that foster economic, social and cultural 
ties amongst member nations, often at the exclusion of security related matters.116  
Reinforcing this attitude was its identity and the foundation of their decision-making 
strategy, called the “ASEAN Way,” based upon the principle of non-interference.117  It 
has been characterized “by the dual Malay terms of musyawarah (consulation) and 
mufakat (consensus), which is a step by step process of dialogue over issues designed to 
build confidence and avoid conflict amongst members.”118  The end of the Cold War 
convinced ASEAN members that collective security arrangements would be needed, so 
they took steps to ensure agreements between nations would be in place.  In 1992, in the 
Singapore declaration, ASEAN acknowledged “the necessity of regional security 
cooperation,” for the first time.119  In 1997, ASEAN recognized piracy as a regional 
problem and took steps to implement change in the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational 
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Crime.120  Further efforts in 2001 included ASEAN developing a transnational crime unit 
that specialized in “terrorism, trafficking in persons, piracy, arms smuggling, money 
laundering, commercial crime and cyber crime.”121  ASEAN members also signed a 
“Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security that 
acknowledged the need for greater cooperation and coordination in 2002.”122  Lastly, in 
2004, at a meeting in Tokyo, 14 members from the ASEAN + 3 forum plus India, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh agreed to establish an Information Sharing Center (ISC) in 
Singapore under the terms of the ReCAAP agreement.123  
In 1993, ASEAN nations agreed to create a forum that addressed regional security 
needs. Called the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), its purpose has been to increase 
participation and promote dialogue on security matters that include piracy and armed 
robbery at sea.  Their membership has now expanded to include Australia, Bangladesh, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States and Vietnam.124  In 2003, to 
strengthen anti-piracy measures, the ARF adopted the Statement on Cooperation against 
Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, which encouraged participants to adopt 
“bilateral and multilateral cooperation among ARF members to combat piracy, including 
increased personnel contact, information exchanges and anti-piracy exercises, on the 
basis of respecting territorial integrity, sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in 
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accordance with....”125 In 2004, at the ARF workshop on Maritime Security in Kuala 
Lumpur, participants agrees that collective action was required to address maritime 
threats and issues, such as the safety of navigation and the development of a surveillance 
and timely information system.126  
Additional regional mechanisms that stress cooperation and information sharing 
include the establishment in 2006 of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy (ReCAAP) and the Cooperative Mechanism for the Strait of Malacca and 
Singapore in 2007.  
4.  International Efforts 
International pressure has also played a role in reducing piracy.  In 2004, the U.S. 
Pacific Command proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), a long-
term approach aimed at addressing transnational threats, such as terrorism, trafficking in 
humans, drugs, movement of illicit cargo and piracy in the Asia Pacific region.127  Its 
purpose was to deny the maritime regime to criminals and terrorists ensuring a secure 
maritime environment.  The focus was supposed to promote cooperation and security 
amongst regional and international states but failed because of comments made in 2004 
to Congress by the then Commander of the United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM), Admiral Fargo.  He remarked that the United States was looking at placing 
Special Forces on high-speed vessels in the Strait of Malacca to interdict terrorists.128  
Fargo’s comments provoked an outcry from the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and 
Indonesian Defense Minister, both of whom rejected the idea.  They felt that the presence 
of U.S. forces would infringe upon their sovereignty and would not be tolerated in the 
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Strait of Malacca.129  Although the RMSI ultimately failed, another avenue of approach 
used by the U.S. has been to provide capacity-building support in the form of technical 
assistance, training programs, joint exercises and information exchange.130   
The unintended result of Admiral Fargo’s comments led the United States to 
switch from initiatives aimed at overt U.S. involvement to those that provided funding for 
capacity building programs.  For example, external assistance provided by the United 
States has been used to monitor terrorist activity in the Strait of Malacca.  In fiscal years 
2006–2008, Indonesia received 57.5 million dollars in funds to improve its maritime 
situational awareness capabilities to include the installation of coastal radars to monitor 
deter and interdict terrorists, criminals and pirates operating in the Strait of Malacca.131  
In FY 2007–2008, Malaysia received 16.3 million dollars for nine coastal radars along 
the Sabah coast and money to upgrade its aerial surveillance capabilities.132  A by-
product of funding security and terrorism related concerns, has allowed the littoral states 
to address and strengthen other security needs, such as piracy by providing increased 
surveillance and coordination.  Other efforts by the U.S. include participation in regional 
exercises, such as the Cooperation and Readiness Afloat (CARAT) and South East Asia 
Cooperation against Terrorism (SEACAT). 
Japan has played a significant role by promoting several successful bilateral and 
multilateral anti-piracy initiatives.  Japanese maritime security strategy relies upon the 
safety and security of the Strait of Malacca because 99 % of its oil and 70% of its food 
arrives by sea, most of it coming through the Malacca Strait region.133  Closure of the 
strait for any reason would have a significant economic impact on Japan.  An example 
that highlighted Japan’s concern was the collision between the oil tanker, Nagasaki Spirit, 
 
129 Rosenberg and Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 55. 
130 The Malaysia Insider, “How Piracy can be, and is being Defeated,” The Malaysia Insider (January 
2009), http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/world/16283-how-piracy-can-be-and-is-being-
defeated (accessed August 14, 2009). 
131 Inspectors General, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, Interagency 
Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, IE 2009-007 (Washington D.C., August 
31, 2009), 2.  
132 The Malaysia Insider. 
133 Rosenberg and Chung, “Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” 56. 
 40
                                                
and the container vessel, Ocean Blessing in the Strait of Malacca following a suspected 
pirate attack.  The resultant fires burned for five days consuming over 100,000 tons of 
Japanese petroleum, killing the crews of both vessels.134  Although this incident did not 
have significant economic effects, it pushed the Japanese towards promoting cooperation 
amongst Southeast Asian nations in an effort to promote safety and security.  Bilateral 
approaches taken by the Japanese coast guard have yielded results through training, 
equipping and funding all of the coastal states in the South China Sea.135  In 2000, the 
Japanese coast guard conducted anti-piracy training with India and Malaysia.  Since then, 
the Japanese have conducted training with all three of the strait nations and other 
Southeast Asian nations, such as Brunei, India and the Philippines.136  Despite the 
success, multilateral approaches have fared less well because of opposition by Malaysia 
and Indonesia over Japanese involvement in patrolling the straits.  
F.  OUTCOMES 
For the first three quarters of 2009, IMB data shows that there have only been 
thirty-two attacks in Southeast Asian waters compared to forty-one in 2008.137  The 
reason for the decline has been the response by littoral, regional and extra-regional states 
to increased security and cooperative mechanisms in an effort to reduce the number of 
pirate attacks.  What is significant is that national, bilateral and multilateral efforts had 
varying levels of effect, but by themselves, were unable to reduce the number of attacks 
by pirates.  Regional efforts by ASEAN and ARF nations, in particular those proposed 
after 2001, which includes the Malacca Strait Patrols, ReCAAP and the Cooperative 
Mechanism, promoted cooperation and information sharing but by themselves could not 
solve piracy.  Reasons include historical animosity towards former colonial powers, 
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distrust of outside interference and heightened concern over the erosion of state 
sovereignty.  International support provided by the United States, Japan and other nations 
provided avenues of cooperation in the form of dialogue, exercises and capacity-building 
programs for regional governments.  Reducing the number attacks required a 
comprehensive, multilayered approach that could not have been done without the 
cooperation of national, regional and extra-regional support. 
 
Location 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Indonesia 121 94 79 50 43 28 7 
Malacca 
Straits 38 38 12 11 7 5 2 
Malaysia 5 9 3 10 9 10 14 
Myanmar  1    1 1 
Philippines 12 4  6 3 6 1 
Singapore 
Straits 2 8 7 5 3 6 6 
Table 2.   Piracy Incidents in Indonesia by Location and Year138 
In conclusion, a series of events conspired to weaken pirates between 2003 and 
2005.  Table 2 shows that piracy peaked in 2003 for all of Southeast Asia and has steadily 
declined since then.  Of the three littoral governments that comprise the Malacca Strait, 
Indonesia was the most affected by piracy.  The Asian financial crisis increased economic 
and political instability within Indonesia, which weakened their ability to combat piracy 
effectively.  As the political and economic situation eased, it made possible better 
authority on land, over water and between its neighbors.  As a result, national and 
multilateral measures tended to produce more operational cooperation in the form of 
coordinated maritime patrols and airborne surveillance flights, which can be linked to the 
reduction in piracy.  Regional and international efforts focused more on information 
sharing, capacity building and dialogue between nations, which did not have a direct 
effect but promoted overall cooperation that could have likely sustained the decline in 
piracy.  An additional factor that might have contributed to the overall reduction in 
attacks was the December 2004 Tsunami that hit parts of Southeast Asia. Indonesia was 
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hit particularly hard, and this resulted in the destruction of many villages and fishing 
boats used by pirates.  According to the IMB, there were no incidents noted for two 
months after the attacks, although attacks did later resume.139  
Maintaining the momentum requires sustaining and strengthening the multi-
layered approach to anti-piracy efforts that have already been put in place.  The Asian 
financial crisis is an example of how swiftly economic problems can manifest themselves 
into political and security issues, possibly echoing the current global economic downturn.  
Today, the Indonesian Navy lacks the required number of vessels to carry out 
security patrols along its vast coastline. Of those they have, at any given time, only 25% 
are serviceable.140  Without continued financial support and backing for anti-piracy 
initiatives, it is unlikely that they can maintain what vessels they have, providing 
incentives for pirates to strike.  A bellwether of the current economic downturn in 
Southeast Asia is a “ghost fleet” numbering hundreds of empty ships, anchored of the 
coast of Singapore waiting to be used, evidence that the economic crisis has begun to 
affect the region severely.141  Only time will tell if the “Asian model” of piracy continues 
to work.  
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III.  PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly addresses the historical background of piracy in the waters off 
the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and then examines why it spread throughout 
the region to become a focal point for international counter-piracy operations.  It begins 
by analyzing the typology of piracy in this region, causal factors, and the response to 
piracy by regional, extra regional states and the outcomes of their actions to date. 
The waters of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are critical sea lines of 
communication that link together Europe and the Middle East.  Over 20,000 ships a year 
pass with 12% of the world’s oil supply.  According to the annual piracy report from the 
IMB, in 2008, there were “111 incidents of piracy reported for the east coast of Somalia 
and the Gulf of Aden, an increase of over 200% compared to 2007.”142  Of those, “42 
vessels were hijacked and 815 crew members taken hostage by Somali pirates.”143  
Figure 1 illustrates, when compared to other regions in the world, the area off the coast of 
the Horn of Africa has become one of the world’s most dangerous waters for piracy.  
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143 Ibid. 
 Figure 1.   IMB Piracy Reporting Center144 
B. HISTORY OF PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
Similar to Southeast Asia, piracy in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean has a 
history that dates back hundreds of years.  In the 17th century, European trading 
companies, such as the Dutch East India Company and the Honorable East India 
Company (HEIC) maintained trading outposts throughout Asia and the Indian Ocean in 
places, such as the Cape of Good Hope, India and China.145  The increase in trade 
between Europe, Asia and Africa provided indigenous and European pirates greater 
opportunities to attack ships.  Sea trade in this region covered enormous distances and 
required bases of operations for pirates to rest and refit.  European and colonial pirates 
seeking access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean used the island of Madagascar as a base 
of operations to launch attacks on merchant ships that frequently travelled throughout the 
region.  One of the most feared pirates in the late 17th century was Kanhoji Angria.  A 
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native of India, he began attacking ships in the Indian Ocean starting in the 1690s. By 
1715, he had amassed a chain of forts along the coast of Bombay to attack vessels of the 
various trading companies.146  It would take a sustained naval presence by European 
navies, such as the British, to counter the commerce raiding and piracy prevalent in the 
region. 
Contemporary piracy in the Horn of Africa has its roots in the civil war and the 
subsequent failure of the Somali government in 1991.  The lack of security on land 
emboldened foreign fishing fleets to operate closer to shore at the expense of local 
fisherman and allowed foreign nations to dump toxic materials in their waters.147  Angry 
fisherman, claiming to be members of the Somali Coast Guard or the Somali Marines, 
attacked vessels deemed to be fishing illegally in the waters off Somalia.148  They often 
held ships and their crews for ransom until a fee was paid by owners of ships eager to 
avoid exposure and publicity.  According to Peter Lehr, Somali fisher communities began 
to struggle for three reasons. 
 First, foreign trawlers were coming closer to shore, depriving local Somali 
fisherman of their catch. 
 Second, foreign trawlers were using prohibited fishing equipment, 
including nets with small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting 
systems to increase the size of their catch, leaving little fish behind. 
 Finally, foreign vessels were attacking Somali fisherman by destroying 
their equipment and sometimes ramming their boats with larger vessels.149 
The dumping of illegal waste off the coast of Somalia was an additional concern 
to fisherman and their communities.  According to a United Nations Environmental 
Report, foreign ships have been suspected of dumping toxic waste, such as uranium, lead 
and mercury, and other hazardous materials off Somalia’s waters for years because it was 
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cheaper to do so.150  It is estimated that it costs “$2.50 per tonne to dump hazardous 
waste in Africa as opposed to $250 per tonne in Europe.”151  In response to reports of 
illegal dumping, in 2005 a UN technical fact finding mission visited Hafun, Bandar Beyla 
and Eyl in the Puntland region of Somalia to investigate evidence of toxic waste brought 
to shore by the Tsunami in December 2004, but no found evidence.152  
As time progressed, tactics used by pirates evolved from attacking fishing boats 
close to shore to the use of mother ships to attack larger ships farther out to sea.153  By 
2006, ships were regularly hijacked as far away as 350 km from the Somali coast, as well 
as the Gulf of Aden, providing evidence of increased technical and organizational 
skills.154  
One of the most significant years for piracy was 2008.  Of the 293 reported 
attacks in that year, 92 were recorded in the Gulf of Aden and 19 off the coast of 
Somalia.155  Calls for help by the shipping industry and maritime organizations prompted 
the United Nations Security Council to react by issuing several resolutions that 
authorized intervention and the use of force by the international community to address 
piracy.  One of the largest seizures ever by Somali pirates was the hijacking of the oil 
tanker, Sirius Star, in November 2008 that occurred 450 miles southeast of Mombasa, 
Kenya.  It was subsequently taken to the territorial waters off Somalia where it remained 
until ransom demands by the hijackers were met.156  This prompted the Chairman of the  
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, to remark at a news conference, that he 
was  “stunned by the range of it,” when referring to the distance at which the Sirius Star 
was hijacked.157   
Despite the efforts of the international community, pirate attacks continue.  
According to the IMB, in the first three months of 2009, the Gulf of Aden and the east 
coast of Somalia accounted for 61 of the reported 102 attacks on ships in the world.  Of 
41 incidents reported in the Gulf of Aden, five were hijacked, and in the waters off of 
Somalia, there were 20 attempted attacks and four hijackings.158  
C. TYPES OF PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
Piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden is distinct from piracy in other 
regions for several reasons.  First, attacks are exclusively hijackings for ransom and have 
evolved to become business transactions requiring payouts for the release of a ship and its 
crew.  The increase in reward has led pirates to accept greater risks that include targeting 
ships farther out to sea and confrontations with maritime forces.  The methodology of 
pirate attacks falls somewhere between the actions of opportunistic sea robbers and 
organized pirate gangs.159  Pirates have adopted a simplistic approach to selecting vessels 
for attack, as evidenced by their haphazard targeting of coalition warships, but in their 
formidable ship boarding skills they appear to be closer in organization to opportunistic 
sea robbers.  Their ability to execute attacks far from shore and their use of land-based 
support in ransom negotiations also indicates a level of organization and sophistication 
indicative of an organized pirate gang.  
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Second, the proliferation of small arms in Africa has given pirates an advantage 
when attacking a vessel and holding its crew hostage.  Pirates are well armed and 
consistently use weapons, such as machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to 
take over a target, defend themselves, and intimidate the crew.  
Third, pirates continue to evolve.  According to Raymond Gilpin, the pirates’ 
business model has progressed over time to include seven phases of operations: 
“reconnaissance and information gathering; coordinated pursuit; boarding and takeover; 
steaming to safe areas; negotiations; ransom payment; and disembarkation and safe 
passage.”160  This evolution required building infrastructure and logistical support from 
local communities to provide intelligence, fuel and needed supplies.  As ships moved 
further from land to avoid being hijacked, Somali pirates adapted by using captured 
vessels as “mother ships” to support smaller boats or skiffs to increase their range.  Often 
working together in groups, they attack slow moving targets with low freeboards using 
grappling hooks and ladders to board a vessel.  Once hijacked, the vessel is towed to an 
anchorage within sight of land where pirates negotiate ransom demands for the return of 
the crew.  
D. CAUSES OF PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
1.  Legal and Jurisdictional Weakness 
Legal and jurisdictional weakness is an outgrowth of statelessness that exists in 
Somalia.  The inability to apprehend and try suspects within its own legal institutions has 
put the burden of detaining and trying suspects in a court of law on its regional neighbors 
that also have weak national legal systems and maritime forces.  This has been an 
enabling factor that has given pirates an advantage when conducting attacks.  Legal 
actions taken by Yemen so far have been limited because of lack of resources and 
international support. The United States has been unable to reach bilateral legal 
agreements with Yemen to turn over suspected pirates for trial because of concerns over 
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the strength of their legal system.161  European Union member states have been reluctant 
to sign anti-piracy legal agreements, which provide for the detention and adjudication of 
suspected pirates because of concerns over European human rights legislation that comes 
into conflict with Yemen’s use of the death penalty.162  
Conflicts between the national laws of maritime forces and international law have 
also been cited as a way for pirates to exploit weakness in anti-piracy efforts.  In April 
2009, the Canadian warship HMCS Winnipeg seized a boat with suspected pirates and 
weapons onboard.  Despite having jurisdiction under international and Canadian law, the 
pirates were disarmed and subsequently released because the Canadian government 
believed they lacked jurisdiction.163  Until participating nations are able to update their 
laws, pirates will continue to exploit this disorder. 
Several methods by the international community have been used to counter this 
confusion.  These include Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and United Nations 
resolutions.  In early 2009, the United States and Great Britain agreed to sign MOUs with 
Kenya and the Seychelles that provided maritime forces with the ability to turn over 
suspected pirates and try them in local courts of law.  Another method employed has been 
the use of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).  Prior to United 
Nations legal intervention in 2008, foreign warships pursuing suspected pirate vessels 
were unable to enter Somali territorial waters.  Once inside, pirates were free from 
pursuit, creating safe havens that allowed pirates to operate unrestricted, free from 
retribution.  In response, UNSCR 1816 established a framework that provided states, in 
cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the ability to enter the 
territorial waters of Somalia to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.164  
Despite UNSCRs providing states with the authority to act, it is often not enough.  
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2.  Favorable Geography 
The geography of Somalia plays a key role that enables pirates to execute attacks 
and is significant for several reasons.  First, Somalia occupies almost 2,000 miles of 
mostly unsecured coastline that borders the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, giving 
pirates a wide berth to hijack and hold ships.  This provides numerous areas from which 
pirates can conduct attacks without fear of retribution from outside countries. Second, 
Somalia occupies a strategic location that lies between the Red Sea and the Straits of Bab 
al Mandeb in the north, the Gulf of Aden in the east and the Indian Ocean to the south, a 
gateway for world commerce.  To the north, Yemen encompasses the northern boundary 
that forms the Gulf of Aden.  According to the U.S. Department of Energy, “in 2006, as 
many as 3.3 million barrels of oil per day were transiting the Bab el Mandeb strait 
between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea,”165 making this region an economic and 
strategic necessity for many nations.  Third, there are limited options if a shipping 
company chooses to avoid the Gulf of Aden.  The only alternative requires ships to round 
the Cape of Good Hope near South Africa, adding time, fuel and crew costs. 
Unsecured coastlines of both Somalia and Yemen provide numerous areas for 
pirates to conduct operations and receive support.  In Somalia, two primary bases of 
operation include facilities in the Puntland district of Eyl in Northeast Somalia and the 
Mudug district of Hararderra (Xarardheere).166  Other bases include Garad, Hobyo and 
Mogadishu.  
The Yemeni coastline also provides numerous areas for pirates to operate.  It is 
believed that pirates in the Gulf of Aden have been receiving support from individuals 
that live along the coast.  According to Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, a NATO commander 
and U.S. naval officer, logistics supplies, such as boat engines and fuel have been 
supplied to pirates.167   
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Lastly, weather is another geographic factor that can play a vital role in the 
frequency of attacks.  The monsoon season in the Indian Ocean lasts from April to 
September, which is characterized by high winds and seas.168  This makes navigating 
smaller ships difficult, especially skiffs and smaller boats used by pirates in attacks.  In 
September 2009, changing weather patterns prompted Coalition Maritime Forces to issue 
an advisory to all mariners warning of an expected increase in pirate attacks.169 
3.  Conflict and Disorder 
In the Horn of Africa, conflict and disorder continues to play a significant role in 
enabling pirates to stage operations and attacks ships throughout the region.  Piracy that 
has plagued Somalia and spilled over into the Horn of Africa over the last few years is a 
direct result of the failure of the Barre regime in 1991.  In the past two years, it has 
ranked first in Foreign Policy’s annual listing of failed states.170  In 1988, clan-based 
rivalries, economic and political issues led to warfare between clans in the northern part 
of the country and the south.171  This led to retaliation and repression by the Barre 
government, which precipitated its decent into anarchy.  In 1991, General Barre fled 
Mogadishu as fighting raged throughout the city leaving behind various clan-based 
militias to rule the city.  In addition to the violence, a severe drought gripped the country 
leading to widespread hunger, which led to intervention by the United States and the 
United Nations in 1992.172  
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Similar to Somalia, Yemen faces difficulties that make it at risk for becoming a 
failed state as well.  Domestic concerns include water depletion, declining oil revenues, 
rising fuel prices, unrest in the south and terrorism, all which have combined to weaken 
the government of Yemen.173  Terrorists have used the instability to conduct operations 
in Yemen’s waters.  For example, in 2000, Al Qaeda-linked militants attacked the USS 
Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden that killed 17 sailors and wounded numerous others.  In 
October 2002, terrorists attacked the MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen spilling 90,000 
gallons of oil killing one crewman. 
4.  Underfunded Law Enforcement and Lack of Security  
In the Horn of Africa, law enforcement and security operations are critical to the 
fight against piracy because of large coastlines and the amount of area to be covered.  In 
Somalia, the absence of security has had a significant effect on its rapid rise and growth.  
The absence of law enforcement and security has allowed foreign fishing vessels to 
exploit Somali fishing resources and permitted nations to dump hazardous material in 
their waters.  Prior to 1991, the protection of Somali waters belonged to the Somali Navy, 
which consisted of several small patrol boats maintained by the Soviet Union.  Soon after 
the Soviets withdrew, the ships that remained soon fell into disrepair.174  Subsequent 
efforts at establishing a maritime presence through private security companies have failed 
as well.  For example, in November 2005 the U.S. security firm TOPCAT signed a $50-
$55 million contract with the TFG to target Somali mother ships, but was unable to begin 
operations because of the arms embargo on Somalia.175 
One reason why Yemen has had difficulty addressing piracy is because it does not 
have enough patrol boats to secure its waters.  Consisting of 1,000 people and 40 boats,  
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Yemen’s coast guard is not large enough to patrol the entire coastline and has had to 
restrict its operations to Aden harbor until larger boats can be acquired to operate on the 
open ocean.176  
5.  Permissive Political Environments  
For countries in the Horn of Africa, seaborne trade is an essential connection to 
the global community and their economies.  State failure and lax political environments 
take advantage of this link and provide the perfect opportunity for piracy to grow.  Bribes 
are often required to gain intelligence on the location of ships or the support of local 
officials to look the other way when providing arms and supplies to pirates.  Without 
local support, pirates would be unable to execute attacks at sea or coordinate ransoms on 
land for crews being held hostage.  In Puntland, one of the major logistical and staging 
areas for pirates in the north, corruption has reached all levels of society and 
government.177  According to Roger Middleton, it is significant that Puntland is the home 
of President Abdullahi Yusuf because it is likely that the Somali government and clan 
structure benefit from organized piracy.178  In the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, 
which measures the perception of corruption in 180 countries, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Yemen and Djibouti all scored in the bottom half with Somalia, Kenya and Yemen 
ranking 180, 147 and 141, respectively.179  
6.  Cultural Acceptability 
Somalia does not have a cultural history of piracy but it has become acceptable 
because chronic poverty, starvation and lawlessness have left ordinary Somalis with little 
alternative.  In some communities, pirates are viewed as heroes.  In a phone interview 
with the BBC, Dahir Mohamed Hayeysi, a local pirate, stated that in his community 
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pirates are seen as heroes. “We have local support; most of the people here depend on 
pirates directly or indirectly.  Because if there is a lot of money in the town they can get 
some through friendship, relatives or business.”180  In the town of Eyl in Punland, 
hijacked ships are often anchored in sight of coastal villages where pirates receive fuel, 
supplies and reinforcements from local residents.  
7.  Promise of Reward 
The payment of ransom to secure the release of hostages and their vessels adds 
another layer of complexity that must be addressed.181  Ransom payouts reinforce the 
idea that piracy pays.  The prospect of easy money lures new recruits and encourages the 
cycle of hijackings and ransom payments.  If shipping companies choose to withhold 
payment, the social and financial costs could severely limit seaborne trade and the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance desperately needed in the region.  
When faced with endemic poverty, hunger and lawlessness on land, the risks of 
being caught or killed while attacking ships at sea must seem minor when compared to 
the potential return.  In Somalia, the average income is estimated to be around $650 per 
year, making the risk-to-reward ratio that attracts pirates an easy choice.  In 2008, an 
average ransom paid for the return of a ship and its crew was between half-a-million and 
$2 million.182  For an entry-level pirate, his share of the take is likely to yield in excess of 
$10,000 depending in the size of the ransom.183  It is estimated that ransom payments 
paid out by shipping companies were between $18–$30 million dollars.184  In Puntland, 
ransom money has provided social mobility for many pirates. “They have money; they 
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have power and they are getting stronger by the day,”185 says Abdi Farah Juha, a resident 
of Garowe. “They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have 
new cars and guns.”186  Until an alternative to paying ransoms can be found, ship-owners 
continue to fuel the demand for hijackings and ransoms. 
E.  THE RESPONSE TO PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
The response to piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden so far has 
emphasized international efforts to combat piracy.  The reasons are as varied as the 
individual states and organizations that have responded to the United Nations call for 
assistance.  For the United States, maritime strategy is based on freedom of the seas.  For 
many nations, their economies are dependent upon the transportation of goods by sea, 
and disruption can have lasting economic and security implications.  Reasons behind the 
multinational response include: 1) disruption of trade; 2) disruption of World Food 
Program shipments to Somalia; 3) the potential for environmental damage; and 4) 
potential terrorist threats to the region.187  
To date, the response to piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has 
included national, bilateral, regional and international efforts.  In addition, the lack of 
security on land has required the services of private security companies and the actions of 
the shipping industry as well. 
1. National Efforts 
The national response to piracy by countries, such as Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, 
have met with little success in addressing legal and jurisdictional weakness, primarily 
because few resources are available, such as naval ships, personnel and infrastructure 
when compared to land-based forces.  Despite these setbacks, efforts have been made to 
combat piracy.  
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a. Kenya 
According to Paul Wambua, African navies “are not thought to be as 
necessary as other branches of the armed forces and are often considered last in 
budgetary allocations.”188  The Kenyan Navy, considered one of the best-trained and able 
forces in East Africa, ranks third in that country’s military structure.189  Despite the 
limitations, Kenya has a small coastal navy that includes several fast attack and patrol 
vessels that could be used to interdict pirates but so far has played a limited role because 
participation has been limited to legal agreements between the United States and other 
coalition forces that detain and try suspects.190  
b. Somali TFG 
The Somali TFG has recently taken its first steps to reconstitute its Coast 
Guard by training 500 officers for a new Somali Coast Guard funded largely by 
international donations.191  Until the TFG is able to acquire operable patrol boats, these 
efforts are ineffectual at best.  Somaliland and Puntland have small coast guards as well 
but are limited by resources.  In addition, Puntland and Somaliland have taken limited 
actions by arresting and imprisoning small numbers of pirates in their territory. 
c. Yemen 
The Yemeni Navy and coast guard so far has played a small role in 
securing its side of the Gulf of Aden because of budgetary and logistical concerns. 
Despite these constraints, efforts have been made to increase the overall strength of the 
Yemen Navy and coast guard.  For example, in 2008, the Yemeni coast guard formed an  
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anti-piracy unit with 1,600 Special Forces soldiers and 16 patrol boats purchased to 
combat piracy.192  In 2009, the United States provided funding for the purchase of two 
patrol boats and radios to augment the Yemeni Navy.193    
National efforts so far have been insufficient to combat piracy because of 
the lack of security, resources and political instability within the region.  Pirates have 
been able to exploit these weaknesses and as a result, have been able to establish safe 
havens where they can plan and stage attacks without fear of government intervention.   
2.  Bilateral Efforts 
Efforts towards bilateral cooperation have been limited and have contributed to 
strengthening legal and jurisdictional weaknesses found on land and at sea.  In January 
2009, Kenya and the United States signed a MOU that allowed captured suspected pirates 
to be turned over, tried in their courts and imprisoned if found guilty.  This prevents 
having to transfer suspects back to the flag countries of the vessel attacked or the warship 
that caught them.  The British and the European Union have signed similar agreements 
with Kenya as well.194  
Puntland has made efforts towards working with coalition forces.  For instance, 
EU NAVFOR forces have signed legal agreements that permit suspected pirates to be 
turned over to regional authorities similar to agreements signed by Kenya.  Other efforts 
include NATO and other international partners recently establishing a close working 
relationship with officials of Puntland’s regional administration to identify pirates better 
and to reduce confrontations with local fisherman.195  According to NATO, the HMS 
Cornwall and the USS Donald Cook recently embarked Coast Guard officers in an effort 
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to identify areas that pirates operate out of as a way to curtail illegal activity.196 
Additional bilateral efforts between nations include ongoing operations between the 
Seychelles Coast Guard and EU Naval Forces Operation ATALANTA to track and detain 
suspected pirates and a recent proposal for joint naval patrols between Kenya and 
Tanzania to curb piracy in their waters.197 
The Bilateral response between regional governments in the Horn of Africa has 
been largely ineffective and insufficient to combat piracy.  This is due to the lack of 
cooperation, resources and political instability within the region.  Legal agreements 
between Kenya and coalition maritime forces have provided a short-term solution for the 
legal and jurisdictional weakness found at sea but do not address causes of piracy on 
land.  Bilateral agreements that emphasize cooperation and communication need to be 
encouraged between regional governments if piracy is to be reduced. 
3.  Regional Efforts 
Regional cooperation has started to play an important role in organizing and 
providing support to nations affected by piracy.  Causal factors addressed by their efforts 
include underfunded law enforcement and lack of security.  
On January 31, 2009, 17 regional governments attended the IMO sponsored 
Djibouti Code of Conduct that included Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the 
Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Yemen and Tanzania.  The conference aimed to find 
solutions to the crisis.  The gathering of nations resulted in the adoption of a code of 
conduct for states to abide by to help address the problems of piracy and armed robbery. 
By signing the agreement, participating nations have agreed to cooperate fully through 
the implementation of several cooperative mechanisms.  This includes the sharing and 
reporting of information through national focal points and information centers, 
interdicting ships suspected of piracy, ensuring those suspected of piracy are apprehended 
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and the treatment and care for those who have been subjected to violence.198  To support 
the information-sharing component, three regional facilities were proposed that include 
the Maritime Rescue Coordination Center in Mombasa, Kenya, the Sub-Regional 
Coordination Center in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and a regional maritime information 
center in Sana’a Yemen.199  The agreement also left open the possibility of shared 
operations between countries that include exchanging ship riders and establishing a 
regional training center in Djibouti.200  
Efforts so far by regional governments to cooperate on matters of piracy and 
robbery at sea as outlined in the Djibouti Code of Conduct are promising but insufficient 
to combat piracy.  Many of the nations that signed the agreement have political and 
economic problems that limit their abilities to address some of the most basic causal 
factors of piracy.  In addition, the Code of Conduct encourages but does not require 
governments to act, which provides little incentive to cooperate once piracy fades from 
the headlines.  Continued emphasis needs to be placed on the importance of regional 
approaches to combating piracy.  
4.  International Efforts 
The international response so far has been predominantly a sea-based approach 
that has addressed legal and jurisdictional weakness that has spread from land to the 
ocean by providing security for ships at sea.  Actions have been taken through coalition 
maritime forces and through the introduction of several IMO and United Nations 
resolutions that have encouraged and provided a legal framework for response. 
The IMO, whose main focus has been to “develop and maintain a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for shipping and its remit today that includes safety, environmental 
concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, maritime security and the efficiency of 
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shipping,”201 has issued several documents relevant to ship owners and nations tackling 
piracy in the Horn of Africa.  These include the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS), IMO resolution A1002. (25) and the promulgation of best practices 
to deter piracy supported by the shipping industry in MSC.1/Circ. 1322. 
The ISPS code was designed to address the security requirements for 
governments, ports and shipping companies.  Its purpose has been to provide a 
“standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset 
changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships at port facilities.”202  For ships’ 
captains, this has provided guidance on how to implement ship security plans and 
identified requirements to have onboard equipment able to provide a credible deterrent to 
hijackers.203 
In 2007, the IMO assembly adopted IMO resolution A1002 (25), which called for 
action by member states, the Somali TFG and regional nations to address piracy off the 
coast of east Africa.  It also called for the TFG to advise the United Nations Security 
Council that it consented to a military presence in its territorial waters, laying the 
groundwork for future resolutions by the UN that provide for intervention.204 
Later, in February 2009, the IMO issued MSC.1/Circ. 1322, which endorsed a 
comprehensive plan that addressed best management practices for the shipping industry. 
Its purpose was to provide guidance on security to shipmasters prior to transiting inside 
and outside the Gulf of Aden.205  As a result, the shipping industry as a whole has been 
better able to deter pirate attacks by providing their own security and has been a factor in 
reducing the number of successful pirates.  
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The United Nations Security Council has played a pivotal role in responding to 
piracy.  At the urging of the IMO, and in response to the increase in piracy and armed 
robbery of vessels in the territorial waters and high seas off the coast of Somalia, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) introduced resolution 1816.  For a period of six 
months, 1816 authorized states cooperating with the TFG to “Enter the territorial waters 
of Somalia for the purposes of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”206  
Subsequent resolutions, 1838 and 1846, authorized actions for a year and allowed 
participating nations the ability to “use all necessary means, such as deploying naval 
vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and 
related equipment used for piracy to fight piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali 
coast.”207  Resolution 1851 went a step further by allowing cooperating states to take 
measures on land and at sea.208  This opened the door to intervention by international 
coalitions including CTF-151, NATO, EU NAVFOR and various nations participating 
outside of coalition forces. 
a. Task Forces 
Maritime Task Forces by the United States, European Union and NATO 
have played a critical role in the fight against piracy by providing security and 
communication for merchant ships transiting the region.  In August 2008, in response to 
increased attacks in the Gulf of Aden, CTF-150 and coalition forces established a 
Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) to protect merchant shipping from pirate attacks, 
which subsequently helped to reduce the success rate for pirates.209  In January 2009, 
CTF-151 was established as a multinational task force with a mandate to conduct anti-
piracy missions to deter and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and the waters of 
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the Indian Ocean.  CTF-151 consists of ships and personnel from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey and Yemen.210   
In December 2008, The EU organized operation ATALANTA to provide 
protection for vessels carrying World Food Program deliveries to Somalia and other 
vulnerable vessels in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.  They have been 
authorized to “take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent 
and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery, which may be 
committed in the areas where it is present.”211  EU NAVFOR has also established an 
online center know as the Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa.  Its purpose is to 
provide mariners, ship owners and agents a secure site to “update positions of their 
vessels and receive information and guidance designed to reduce the risk of pirate 
attacks.”212  Similar information sharing services for mariners include a UK Maritime 
Trade Operations office in Dubai and the Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain (MARLO).  
EU NAVFOR has also set up an Internationally Recommended Travel Corridor (IRTC) 
in the Gulf of Aden for merchant shipping to travel through that is regularly patrolled by 
maritime forces. 
Since 2008, NATO has had several standing maritime forces conducting 
anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa region.  The most recent NATO maritime 
force, called Operation Ocean Shield, began operations on August 17, 2009.  Its mandate 
entails four tasks. 
1. Deter, disrupt and protect against pirate attacks, rendering assistance to 
ships in extremis as required. 
2. Actively seek suspected pirates and prevent their continued activity 
through detention, seizure of vessels and property, and the delivery of 
suspects and evidence to designated law enforcement authorities in 
accordance with NATO agreements. 
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3. Facilitate and support the development of regional states’ capacity to 
conduct effective counter-piracy operations, in coordination with other 
related international efforts. 
4. Coordinate NATO operations and initiatives with coalition maritime 
forces, EU naval forces, and other non-NATO forces conducting piracy 
operations off the Horn of Africa.213 
b. Contact Group 
One of the key provisions of UNSCR 1851 encouraged “all states and 
regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia 
to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact 
between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of 
combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast.”214  This led to the 
formation of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia established on 
January 14, 2009.  Six areas of focus were identified for nations to address.  These 
include: 1) improving operational and information support to counter-piracy operations, 
2) establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism, 3) strengthening judicial 
frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates, 4) strengthening commercial 
shipping self-awareness and other capabilities, 5) pursuing improved diplomatic and 
public information efforts, and 6) tracking financial flows related to piracy.215  In 
addition, four working groups were established to address individual areas of focus. 
These include the following. 
 Working Group 1: Military and Operational Coordination, Information 
Sharing, and capacity Building, chaired by the United Kingdom. 
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 Working Group 3: Strengthening Shipping Self-Awareness and Other 
Capabilities, chaired by the U.S. 
 Working Group 4: Public Information, chaired by Egypt.216 
In early September 2009, Working Group 3, chaired by the United States met at 
the United Nations to sign the “New York Declaration” on best management practices 
designed to protect commercial vessels from pirate attacks.  By agreeing to these 
measures, the United States and other flag states, such as Cyprus, Japan, Singapore and 
the United Kingdom, have agreed to adopt self-protection methods in compliance with 
the International Ship and Port Facility Code that makes it more difficult for pirates to 
attack their ships.217 
5. Shipping Industry and Private Sector Response 
The response by the shipping industry and private sector has been guided by the 
inability of regional states to protect their territorial waters and the insufficient number of 
maritime forces available to provide security for merchant ships.  In testimony given 
before the House Armed Service Committee, Vice Admiral Gortney stated, “piracy 
impacts less than 1% of shipping. More than 33,000 vessels a year transit the Gulf of 
Aden.  In 2008, there were 122 attempted attacks, of which 42 were successful.”218  The 
deceptively low numbers have caused the shipping industry and the private sector to 
respond in different ways.  In some instances, ships have altered their routes to avoid the 
waters of the HOA and Indian Ocean rather than risk paying ransom payments.219  Some 
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evasive maneuvers, electric fences, fire hoses and the hardening of interior spaces to 
attack.  In 2005, the crew of the cruise ship Seaborne Spirit used Long Range Acoustic 
Devices (LRADs) that emit loud noises to deter successfully pirates attacking the ship.220  
A more controversial response has been the willingness of ship owners to pay 
ransom for the return of their vessels and crews.  Typically, after a ship is hijacked, 
pirates demand an excessively high payment to the shipping company.  Through 
negotiations that often last several months, the pirates and shipping company eventually 
settle on a price.  It is estimated that ransom payments for 2008 totaled almost 30 million 
dollars.221  Critics of this practice argue that by paying the ransom, shipping companies 
and governments are fueling the demand.  According to Chris Trelawny, head of security 
for the IMO, “Ransom prices are going up because the industry is willing to pay out.  
Ransom payments for an individual vessel have jumped from less than $50,000 five years 
ago to over $3M today.”222  In the most recent attack on a Spanish Trawler in the Indian 
Ocean, pirates have demanded 4 million dollars to release the ship and crew.223  Until 
credible rescue measures can be addressed, shippers are likely to continue to pay ransoms 
for the foreseeable future. 
Private security firms have played a small but growing role in protecting merchant 
shipping as well.  In Somalia, the representative governments that include the TFG, 
Puntland and Somaliland have, at various times, contracted private security services to 
prevent piracy and illegal fishing in their coastal waters.  For example, in 2005, the TFG 
signed a $50 million contract with TOPCAT Marine security to help create a Coast Guard 
and to target Somali mother ships.  The U.S. State Department later blocked their 
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deployment because of a United Nations arms embargo.224  In 1999, HART security was 
contracted to provide training and security for a 70-man force in Puntland, funded by the 
collection of fishing dues, but concluded operations in 2002 due to clan infighting.225  In 
late 2008, Blackwater, a private security company used extensively in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, announced that it too was willing to join the anti-piracy fight by providing 
escort services using a ship with armed guards and a helicopter to those willing to pay.226  
Private security firms have also provided defensive services to shipping companies that 
include the use of razor wire, attack dogs, and visual disruption devices, such as non-
lethal lasers.  The increased vulnerability of crews and ships to attack has provoked 
discussion on the use of firearms by crewmembers and armed security teams.  According 
to Cyrus Mody of the IMB, “providing security personnel can offer useful advice to ship 
captains,” but questions regarding the use of force and the consequences for firing on 
pirates remains.227  Despite best intentions, critics argue that arming crewmembers 
increases the level of violence endangering crews even further.  
Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa is an ongoing effort 
that has been waged mostly through international efforts by maritime forces, shipping 
companies and private security organizations and is the most visible of all responses to 
date.  Overall, actions taken so far have failed to deter pirates from attacking ships 
because they have focused on security at sea without addressing the causes of piracy 
found on land.  The number of attacks in 2009 has already surpassed the yearly total for 
2008.  Where international maritime efforts have been profitable, is their ability to reduce 
the number of successful hijackings carried out by pirates.  Increased security at sea has 
reduced the vulnerability of ships to pirate attacks.  To be effective, international efforts  
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need to focus on the political and economic instability within the Horn of Africa that 
encourage causal factors related to piracy.  Greater emphasis should be placed on land-
based solutions that provide disincentives for fisherman and criminals who hijack ships. 
6.  Outcomes 
According to the IMB, the latest piracy statistics show that there has been an 
overall increase in worldwide pirate attacks.  Thus far, in 2009, there have been 306 
attacks compared to 293 in 2008.228  The main driver of this activity can be attributed to 
increased pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.  What is 
significant is that as the number of attacks has risen, the success rate has declined.  This 
shows that the international response to piracy so far not matched causal factors.  Actions 
taken have had little effect on deterring piracy but have reduced the effectiveness of 
pirate attacks.  Measures put in place by maritime forces, such as patrols, increased 
coordination and the implementation of the IRTC, in addition to the adoption of best 
practices by the shipping industry, has had a significant effect on reducing the number of 
successful attacks.  According to IMB director Pottengal Mukudan, maritime forces 
operating off the coast of Somalia and enhanced security measures put in place by the 
shipping community have “made it difficult for pirates to succeed in their attacks.”229  
Despite the reduction in successful attacks, piracy remains difficult to combat off the 
coast of Somali and the Gulf of Aden for several reasons.  First, the efforts of 
international navies fail to address the root causes of piracy that plague Somalia, such as 
governance, poverty and lawlessness.  They have provided a temporary solution to an 
ongoing regional problem.  Second, the lack of resources available to regional nations in 
the Horn of Africa makes efforts at policing territorial waters difficult to address and 
provide little deterrence for pirates.  Until these issues can be addressed, piracy will 
continue to be a regional problem that requires an international solution. 
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IV. THE RESPONSE TO PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND 
THE HORN OF AFRICA 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw comparisons between piracy in Southeast 
Asia and the Horn of Africa (HOA).  It first identifies similarities and differences in the 
causes of piracy in each region. Then it examines the responses to piracy in each region 
and identifies methods that are most likely to be effective in combating the current crisis 
of piracy affecting the HOA. 
B. CAUSES OF PIRACY 
Despite occurring in different regions of the world, there are similarities and 
differences between the current crisis of piracy in the HOA and the earlier one in 
Southeast Asia.  These include similar causal factors, such as weak governance, 
underfunded law enforcement and security, and similar geographic features that are 
conducive to piracy.  Differences include the typology of attacks and the responses 
generated by regional and extra-regional governments.  
One common casual factor in both regions has been the effects of conflict and 
disorder and its relationship to piracy.  In the mid 1990s, Southeast Asia experienced a 
sharp increase in pirate attacks.  Of the states that encompass the Malacca Strait, 
Indonesia experienced the greatest number.  The Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 
and spread throughout Southeast Asia had a significant impact on the littoral 
governments, especially Indonesia.  The crisis led to economic and political instability 
within Indonesia’s government, which weakened its ability to control its territory.  The 
inability to control its territory led to increases in poverty, corruption, and the lack of 
security, all of which are causal factors that allow piracy to prosper.  Corrupt officials, 
such as harbormasters, dockworkers, police and military forces provided pirates with 
intelligence on the location of ships and provided safe havens to sell their stolen goods.  
The pace of globalization also brought changes to the economies of Southeast Asia, 
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which provided benefits for some people but also left many more behind 
economically.230  This also influenced the rise in maritime traffic transiting through the 
straits providing more opportunities to attack ships as overall security was declining. 
In Somalia, conflict and disorder has been attributed to state failure and is behind 
the increasing number of attacks by Somali pirates in the Horn of Africa.  Table 3 
illustrates the rise in pirate attacks since 2003.  As rates of piracy were declining in 
Southeast Asia, they were increasing in the HOA. 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
27 13 53 29 59 128 154* 
* Pirate attacks beginning January 1–30 September 2009.231 
Table 3.   Reported actual and attempted attacks in the HOA.232 
The failure of the Barre government in 1991 led to a civil war that has left the 
country in ruins and ruled by various clans.  Since then, Somalia has been effectively 
partitioned into three entities, which has made fighting piracy even more difficult for 
Puntland in the northeast, Somaliland in the northwest, and the Somali Transitional 
Federal Government in the south.  The absence of government and security permitted the 
exploitation of Somalia’s waters by foreign fishing vessels and countries looking to dump 
illegal waste in their waters.  Somali fisherman soon began attacking fishing boats and 
holding the crew and vessel for ransom, which, over time, grew to include almost any 
vessel that came within range of Somalia. 
Underfunded law enforcement and security has played a key role in enabling 
piracy by allowing pirates to operate from sanctuaries and the open ocean without fear of 
being caught.  Between 1997 and 1998, the Indonesian defense budget declined by 65%, 
which limited expenditures on maritime forces needed to combat piracy along the 
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straits.233  In addition, part of the funding for the military came from outside the 
Indonesian defense budget and was tied into the economy.  This meant that the military 
was required to find alternative sources of income to upgrade equipment and facilities, 
and pay the salaries of soldiers.  This encouraged members of the military to seek 
alternative means, which included armed robbery and piracy.  
In the HOA, the lack of law enforcement and security has played a significant role 
in allowing pirates to stage attacks and coordinate ransom payments. Regional navies, 
such as Kenya, Yemen and Tanzania, have few resources to patrol their territorial waters 
adequately.  Knowing that intervention on land in Somalia is unlikely, pirates have been 
able to use the coastline of Somalia and Yemen as a staging ground for attacks on ships 
transiting the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.  Once hijacked, a vessel is transported 
to an anchorage within sight of land to conduct hostage negotiations.  The inability of 
Somalia to patrol its waters has allowed piracy to expand into the waters of regional 
neighbors, such as Kenya, Tanzania and Djibouti, disrupting trade and encouraging 
instability throughout the region. 
These regions share similar geographic features, such as coves and inlets that 
enable pirates to conduct attacks by providing sanctuaries from which they can operate. 
The waters of both regions are home to chokepoints that world commerce relies on for 
trade and energy supplies.  In the Malacca and Singapore Straits, over 70,000 vessels a 
year transit through the region that links the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and 
North Asia.  The size of the region that pirates operate in makes combating piracy a 
difficult task.  For example, Indonesia claims “81,000 km of coastline, 3 million sq km of 
territorial waters and an additional 3.1 million square km in their EEZ.”234  The size of 
the area to be patrolled, in addition to the volume of traffic that transits the straits, ensures 
that pirates have a ready supply of vessels to attack.  In addition, on both sides of the 
Malacca Strait, numerous coves and inlets provide pirates with an avenue for quick 
escape after an attack.  
 
233 Dillon, “Piracy in Asia: A Growing Barrier to Maritime Trade.” 
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The Gulf of Aden sits astride the straits of Bab el Madeb, which connect the Red 
Sea to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.  When combined, the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean encompass almost 2.5 million square miles.  Somalia occupies almost 
2,000 miles of coastline and Yemen, its neighbor to the north, over 1,000 miles, 
providing numerous areas for pirates to stage attacks, or from which to receive supplies. 
What makes piracy different in each region is the typology of attacks.  In 
Southeast Asia, pirates operate along a spectrum of actions that include everything from 
petty theft of a ship at anchor, to kidnapping for ransom of a crew and its ship.  Pirates 
generally fall into two groups: 1) opportunistic sea robbers, and 2) organized pirate 
gangs.  Opportunistic sea robbers often sneak aboard ships at night, generally at anchor, 
to steal any valuables that can easily be removed.  Attacks are short in duration and 
require little planning. 
In the HOA, in most instances, pirates have adopted a long-term seizure model, 
which involves boarding a ship, taking the crew hostage, and transporting the vessel to an 
anchorage within sight of land to conduct hostage negotiations.  According to the IMB, 
for the third quarter of 2009, all of the vessels were hijacked while steaming at sea.235 
Similar to organized gangs, pirates do not discriminate on what kind of ship they target 
and have been known to attack bulk carriers, containers, fishing vessels, roll-on-roll-off 
ships, tankers, tugs and yachts.236  They attack any vessel where the opportunity for 
financial gain exists. 
C. RESPONSES TO PIRACY 
Despite similarities in the causes of piracy, the responses have been different in 
each region.  In Southeast Asia, the response by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
played a significant role in the reduction of piracy.  Measures that have been adopted 
include national, bilateral and multilateral-level responses with additional support from  
 
 
235 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report 
(United Kingdom, January 1–September 30, 2009), 27. 
236 Ibid., 23. 
 73
extra-regional nations.  In contrast, the response to piracy in the HOA has been 
characterized mostly by efforts at the international level and within the shipping industry, 
with little emphasis on national, bilateral or regional action. 
1. National Measures in Southeast Asia 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have all taken national measures that 
addressed some of the causes of piracy and have played a significant role in its decline. 
By 2004, as the political and economic climate in Indonesia began to improve, they were 
better able to focus their efforts on maritime security within the country and the region. 
For example, reforms and modernization of the Indonesian navy were implemented to 
increase effectiveness aimed at combating piracy.  In addition, efforts were taken by 
Indonesia to stop piracy on land by addressing causal factors of piracy, such as poverty 
and the welfare of people who lived along the coast.  In Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore, operational measures were introduced, such as establishing command and 
control centers, increased naval patrols, better training and anti-piracy task forces. When 
combined, these measures reduced the effects of piracy.  
2. National Measures in the Horn of Africa 
Unlike Southeast Asia, national efforts by Somalia and its neighbors, Kenya, 
Yemen and Tanzania, have met with little success, primarily because of the lack of 
resources and support from within their countries and the international community. 
National efforts so far have been limited to attempts at building coastal patrol forces in 
Somalia and increasing naval capacity in countries, such as Yemen and Kenya in addition 
to building infrastructure.  
3. Bilateral Efforts in Southeast Asia 
Although not as strong as national efforts, bilateral actions between the littoral 
states have been ongoing for some time and have likely played a role in reducing piracy 
by improving communication, coordination, and cooperation between regional navies 
conducting operations.  For example, coordinated patrols and informational exchanges 
 74
                                                
with an emphasis on communication-sharing capacity have been conducted between 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.237  Another example was the initiation of operation 
SURPIC, in 2005, between Indonesia and Singapore to monitor traffic in the Singapore 
Straits jointly.  Lastly, extra-regional nations, such as India, Japan and Thailand, have 
participated in bilateral patrols of the strait to increase cooperation and security. 
4. Bilateral Efforts in the Horn of Africa 
Efforts toward bilateral cooperation between regional governments have focused 
mainly on establishing legal and jurisdictional mechanisms for the transfer, detention and 
trial of suspected pirates and operational cooperation between maritime forces to deter 
pirates.  In January 2009, Kenya and the U.S. signed a MOU that allowed suspected 
pirates to be turned over and tried in their courts, and imprisoned if found guilty.  Britain 
and the EU have signed similar agreements that permit the transfer of suspected pirates to 
Kenyan courts.  Puntland, where the majority of pirate attacks originate, has reached out 
to maritime forces by signing similar legal agreements with European Naval Forces and 
NATO forces.  Additional efforts include joint patrols between EU NAVFOR and the 
Seychelles Coast Guard, and the proposal for future joint naval patrols between Kenya 
and Tanzania in an effort to curb piracy in their territorial waters.238  
5. Regional Efforts in Southeast Asia 
Regional efforts to combat piracy that emphasized operational measures played a 
significant role in the decline of piracy.  Starting in 1998, one of the first joint efforts was 
the implementation of a multilateral straits reporting system called STRAITREP, which 
was a joint Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore ship-reporting system that emphasized 
information sharing and cooperation amongst straits nations.239  Later, trilateral 
coordinated surface patrols were initiated between the littoral states called the Malacca 
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ter in Djibouti.242 
                                                
Strait Sea Patrols (MALSINDO) to reduce piracy and smuggling activities by conducting 
coordinated patrols in the waters of participating nations.  In 2005, joint air patrols were 
added to strengthen regional efforts under the EIS program.  According to Pottengal 
Mukundan, director of the IMB, coordinated patrols between the littoral states had an 
enormous impact on the decline of piracy because pirates could no longer cross-
jurisdictional boundaries without being pursued.240  Other regional efforts that promoted 
cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms but did not have a direct effect in the 
decline of piracy included regional actions by ASEAN, ARF and ReCAAP, which aimed 
at strengthening cooperation and communication between nations. 
6. Regional Efforts in the Horn of Africa 
Regional efforts to combat piracy, such as the Djibouti code of conduct, have yet 
to show results, but have begun to play a role in organizing, coordinating and providing 
support to regional nations affected by piracy.  By signing the code of conduct, 
participating nations have agreed to several cooperative mechanisms that include sharing 
and reporting information through national focal points and information centers, 
interdicting ships suspected of piracy, ensuring those suspected of piracy are 
apprehended, and the treatment and care of those who have been subjected to 
violence.241  Just as important, the agreement also left open the possibility of shared 
operations between countries, which include exchanging ship riders and the 
establishment of a regional training cen
7. International Efforts in Southeast Asia 
International efforts that emphasized cooperative mechanisms, such as the 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative proposed by the United States, met with significant 
resistance by Indonesia and Malaysia because of concerns over their sovereignty and 
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external intervention.  This prompted Indonesia, Malaysia, and later Singapore to 
coordinate efforts to conduct security operations in the Malacca Strait.  Extra-regional 
governments were limited to providing support through capacity-building programs that 
emphasized increasing regional security.  This included funding for the construction of 
radar stations, implementing training programs, and adding additional patrol craft after 
the decline in piracy had already begun.  
8. International Efforts in the Horn of Africa 
The most visible of these efforts has been the establishment of maritime task 
forces by the United States and Europe, in addition to individual maritime efforts by 
other nations, such as China, Iran and India.  CTF-151, EU NAVFOR and NATO 
counter-piracy operations have focused on deterring pirates and protecting ships.  An 
example of their effort is the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, established 
by EU NAVFOR forces in the Gulf of Aden to protect ships.  This is a path 
recommended by EU NAVFOR for mariners to transit the Gulf of Aden to provide 
security and minimize the chances that pirates can attack a vessel. 
Behind the scenes, the IMO has played a key role in organizing the shipping 
industry through various initiatives that emphasized best practices and resolutions aimed 
at organizing the shipping industry.  Efforts by shipmasters to deter piracy using anti-
piracy measures while transiting through the HOA have been directly attributed to 
reducing the number of successful hijackings.243  The UNSC has played a pivotal role in 
addressing the lack of security and governance by responding with resolutions 1816, 
1838, 1846 and 1851, which authorized members of the United Nations to use force at 
sea and on land if necessary to fight piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. 
The Contact Group on Piracy, established in January 2009, has begun to bring 
together countries, organizations and industries to find solutions to the piracy in the 
HOA.  
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The response by the shipping industry and the private sector to piracy in the Gulf 
of Aden and the HOA has been mixed.  In some instances, ships have altered their routes 
to avoid the waters of the HOA and Indian Ocean, rather than risk paying pirate 
ransoms.244  Others have responded by using defensive measures that include increasing 
speed, using evasive maneuvers, electric fences, fire hoses and the hardening of interior 
spaces to attack.  The payment of ransoms has become controversial because it fuels the 
demand for more attacks on ships.  Ransom payments for an individual vessel have 
jumped from less than $50,000 five years ago to over $3M today.”245 
Private security companies have also played a small but growing role in 
combating piracy. Because the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean at cover just over 2.5 
million square miles, the area is too big for maritime forces to cover.  They have provided 
defensive services to shipping companies that include the use of razor wire, attack dogs, 
and visual disruption devices, such as non-lethal lasers.  The increased vulnerability of to 
attack has provoked debate within the shipping industry over the use of firearms by 
crewmembers and armed security teams.  According to Cyrus Mody of the IMB, 
“providing security personnel can offer useful advice to ship captains,” but questions 
regarding the use of force and the consequences for firing on pirates remains.246 
D. COMPARISON OF RESPONSES 
The national response to piracy in Southeast Asia addressed several causal factors 
that have contributed to the rise in piracy.  These include conflict and disorder, and 
underfunded law enforcement and security.  
Conflict and disorder played a key role in the rise of piracy in Southeast Asia. 
Beginning in 2003, Indonesia began to strengthen economically and politically, which 
helped reduce the effects of conflict and disorder caused by the Asian financial crisis and 
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the failure of the Suharto government.  As governance and security improved, so did its 
abilities to combat piracy and cooperate with its regional neighbors.  Table 2 illustrates 
the decline in piracy for Indonesia that began in 2004 and shows that, by 2005, overall 
rates of piracy for the region also began to decline. 
Improvements in law enforcement and security between the littoral states also 
helped reduce the incidents of piracy.  Indonesia established command and control 
centers, increased funding for defense, and increased its presence in the strait through 
naval patrols, such as operation GURITA in 2005 and the adoption of the eyes in the 
skies initiative, which provided for airborne surveillance.  Strengthening relationships 
between Indonesia and its neighbors maximized the impact of actions taken by each 
country.  For example, Malaysia increased security in its waters by implementing an anti-
piracy task force in 2000 and through the creation of the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency in 2005.  Singapore increased security in its waters by increasing 
patrols to deter pirates and by implementing escort procedures for high value targets.  
The collective impact on piracy was to reduce the effects of conflict and disorder, and 
increase security and stability in the straits to deter pirates from conducting attacks. 
In contrast, the national response to piracy in the Horn of Africa has been limited 
and has had no discernable effect because of the daunting security and governance 
problems that the region faces.  The epicenter of piracy is in Somalia, and is a direct 
result of failed governance and poor security.  Other countries in the region, such as 
Yemen, Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, face similar political and economic barriers that 
have limited their abilities to deal with piracy effectively on an individual or collective 
basis.  Despite these limitations, several governments have attempted to address causal 
factors, such as legal and jurisdictional weakness and underfunded law enforcement and 
security to combat piracy.  This includes prosecuting suspected pirates, and building and 
or strengthening coastal patrol forces.  For example, Yemen has taken steps to improve 
its security but has been limited by a lack of resources.  Suspected pirates have been tried 
in Yemeni courts, but due to concerns about the quality of its legal system and its use of 
the death penalty for various crimes, few extra-regional states have been willing to 
deliver suspects to Yemen.  This has limited the ability of maritime forces to provide a 
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deterrent for pirates to operate out of Yemen.  The small size of Yemen’s coast guard has 
also emboldened pirates because it is unable to patrol its side of the coastline within the 
Gulf of Aden, enabling pirates to receive logistical help.  The Somali TFG has 
established a coast guard to patrol the waters off the coast of Somalia, but lacks patrol 
craft to execute its mission.  Both Puntland and Somaliland have small, coastal patrol 
forces, but are limited in size.  Lastly, Kenya and Tanzania have a small coastal patrol 
force, but due to limited numbers of vessels, patrols outside of their respective territorial 
waters are unlikely. 
In Southeast Asia, bilateral responses were limited, but likely contributed to the 
overall decline in piracy by establishing working relationships that emphasized security 
measures and cooperation between the littoral states and extra-regional partners.  An 
example is collaboration between Indonesia and Malaysia on anti-piracy patrols in the 
straits, which established frameworks for cooperation and communication.  In 2005, 
Indonesia and Singapore launched operation SURPIC to monitor traffic in the Singapore 
Straits and to promote cooperation.  Regional efforts included naval exercises that 
emphasized cooperation between Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and India.  Due to the 
limited nature of bilateral agreements between the littoral governments, the impact on 
piracy has been difficult to assess, but it is likely that their efforts helped reinforce 
cooperative mechanisms that would later become important when coordinating the 
regional response to piracy.  
In the HOA, bilateral responses focused more on legal cooperation between 
maritime forces and individual governments, rather than collaboration between regional 
nations.  This has resulted in international efforts that have focused solely on 
strengthening security at sea by providing legal MOUs for the detention and trial of 
suspected pirates caught by maritime forces.  This has been facilitated by establishing 
MOUs between Kenya, the United States, and other coalition maritime forces in 2009.  
Similar legal agreements have been made between EU NAVFOR forces and regional 
authorities in Puntland.  Recently, U.S. and NATO forces have embarked coast guard 
officers from Puntland to help identity pirates and the areas in which they operate.   
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Despite these efforts, bilateral actions so far have failed to deter pirates from attacking 
ships.  In the first nine months of 2009, the total number of attacks in the HOA increased 
to 306, an increase of 13 from the previous year.247  
Two types of regional responses were effective in reducing the number of pirate 
attacks in Southeast Asia.  The first response included multilateral efforts that focused on 
maritime patrols.  Coordinated air and sea patrols between the littoral governments 
helped reduce piracy by providing cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms that 
emphasized security through the presence of maritime forces to reduce the incidents of 
piracy.  The increase in security altered the risk-to-reward ratio for pirates substantially, 
which reduced their incentives for attacking ships.  The second regional response was the 
promotion of regional forums, such as ReCAAP, ASEAN and ARF, which promoted 
cooperation and communication between member nations.  Though regional forums did 
not have a direct effect, they likely contributed to increased communication between 
regional nations, which kept security concerns current, including piracy, which likely 
supported the overall reduction of piracy.  
In the HOA, the regional response has been limited to the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct, which is similar in concept to ReCAAP in Southeast Asia.  It has begun to 
address some of the causes of piracy, such as underfunded law enforcement and a lack of 
security.  Participating nations have agreed to several cooperative mechanisms, which 
include sharing and reporting information through national focal points and information 
centers.  Since the organization is so new, it is too early to tell if these actions will have a 
substantial impact on piracy. 
In Southeast Asia, the international response focused on improving security 
through capacity-building programs after piracy had begun to decline.  The response was 
less pronounced because Indonesia and Malaysia were reluctant to accept intervention by 
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Although many of the capacity-building programs have been aimed at combating 
terrorism, they had the overall effect of providing extra security, which likely contributed 
to the overall continued decline in piracy that Southeast Asia has been experiencing.  
In contrast, actions to combat piracy in the HOA through maritime forces have 
been the most substantive part of the response to date.  The international response has had 
to focus on addressing legal and jurisdictional weakness, and the failure of law 
enforcement and security at sea.  As a result of their efforts, maritime forces have been 
credited with reducing the number of successful attacks on ships.  In 2008, 42 vessels 
were hijacked, along with 833 crewmembers, off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of 
Aden.248  Since the arrival of maritime forces, such as CTF-151, EU NAVFOR, and 
NATO, that number has dropped to 32 vessels, with 533 crewmembers taken hostage.249 
These forces, together with anti-piracy measures adopted by shipping companies and 
private security organizations, show that actions taken are meeting with some success. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The response to combating piracy in Southeast Asia was a multilayered effort that 
emphasized national and multilateral actions used to combat piracy effectively.  As 
Indonesia strengthened its capabilities politically and economically, it was better able to 
combat piracy within in its own waters and cooperate with its neighbors, Malaysia and 
Singapore. National and multilateral efforts that addressed conflict and disorder, 
increased security, and legal and jurisdictional processes between the littoral states were 
the primary reason for the decline in piracy, with regional and international responses 
supporting the overall decline. 
Piracy in the HOA is an outgrowth of the instability in Somalia and is a direct 
result of failed governance and security.  Actions to combat piracy have been 
predominantly sea-based and international in nature.  They have been aimed at deterring 
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pirates and protecting merchant shipping, but have failed to reduce incidents of piracy. 
Least effective have been national and bilateral measures to combat piracy.  Somalia and 
its neighbors lack the capabilities to combat piracy by themselves, and require 
international assistance if they are to be effective.  Similarly, bilateral efforts, such as 
legal MOUs, have had little effect at deterring pirates, and have been used as a 
mechanism by maritime forces to reduce the burden of trying suspects in their respective 
countries. Shipping companies and maritime forces have played a central role by 
encouraging compliance with ISPS codes that strengthen shipboard security measures, 
such as using fire hoses, defensive maneuvers, and the hardening of interior spaces to 
attack.  Until actions can be taken on land to contain the instability in Somalia, piracy 
will continue to be a problem. 
F. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING 
PIRACY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
The aim of this research has been to analyze critically why the United States and 
other countries have been ineffectual in their efforts to stop maritime piracy in the HOA 
and Gulf of Aden region.  This thesis began by asking what methods the United States 
and other maritime countries can use to combat piracy in the HOA most effectively under 
conditions of state failure.  What has been learned is that national efforts that address the 
causes of piracy on land, such as conflict and disorder and the lack of security, have the 
best chance of combating piracy.  In addition, multilateral efforts that emphasize 
cooperation and communication using air and sea patrols contribute by providing 
increased security, which deters pirates.  In the HOA, responses have failed to address 
underlying causal factors that enable piracy, such as conflict and disorder, legal and 
jurisdictional weakness, and lax and underfunded law enforcement.  Despite the best 
efforts of maritime forces, acts of piracy continue to increase.  What is encouraging is 
that the number of successful attacks by pirates has begun to decline overall.  
Piracy in the HOA continues to be a significant problem for the international 
community because it disrupts trade and limits freedom of the seas.  Pirates operating 
among fishermen routinely swarm the Gulf of Aden and have extended their attacks via 
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mother ships into the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula, in search of 
vessels to hijack for ransom.  The response has been predominantly international, and has 
utilized a sea-based approach that has been widely recognized as a temporary fix to a 
permanent problem. 
What is known is that the solution to piracy will not come from maritime forces 
alone. The source of the problem lies in the lawlessness created by the failure of 
governance and security in Somalia.  The poor economic, political and security situation 
that exists in the Horn of Africa provides little incentive for pirates to stop attacking 
ships.  This, coupled with the lack of coastal security and the limited number of warships 
available to protect merchant ships, makes the risk-to-reward calculation favorable to 
pirates.  In addition to Somalia, its neighbors, Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti and Yemen, all 
suffer from some form of economic and political instability, which makes efforts at 
combating piracy from a regional perspective all the more difficult. 
The preceding chapters have examined the rise and fall of piracy in Southeast 
Asia starting in the mid-1990s until the mid-decade of the new millennium and the 
current rise of piracy in the HOA, which began in 2005.  Lessons about how nations in 
Southeast Asia combated the rise of piracy and what responses led to its decline may be 
helpful in addressing the current crisis in the HOA.  
First, piracy needs to be tackled at its source; it requires a domestic solution. 
Indonesia had the greatest number of attacks in its waters and was responsible for the 
increase in rates of piracy between its neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore.  The Asian 
financial crisis, which weakened the whole of Southeast Asia, was particularly 
devastating to Indonesia.  It precipitated economic and political instability, which 
contributed to Indonesia’s inability to control its territory.  This led to increasing rates of 
poverty and corruption, which weakened security.  This provided opportunities for 
villagers living along the coast to attack ships passing through the Malacca Strait and 
throughout the region.  In addition, Indonesia and Malaysia were concerned that 




viewed issues, such as smuggling and terrorism greater than piracy, which led to a lack of 
cooperation and communication.  Improved conditions in Indonesia allowed better 
cooperation and security with Indonesia’s neighbors, which helped to reduce piracy.  
Somalia has been a failed state for almost two decades, which complicates any 
efforts to address the causes of piracy there.  It is widely recognized that direct 
intervention in Somalia by extra-regional nations is unlikely to happen soon because 
there is no incentive to become involved.  Lessons learned from previous humanitarian 
relief efforts in Somalia have made the United States and other nations reluctant to 
involve themselves in nation-building efforts, out of fear of becoming bogged down in a 
Somali civil war.  This has limited the international response to a sea-based approach.  
The implications of lessons learned indicate that piracy can be reduced without 
shore-based measures, but only at great cost.  Piracy is unlikely to be eliminated until 
substantial progress is made in restoring governance and security on land.  International 
measures that curb piracy should include stronger efforts to improve governance within 
the region that piracy exists.  
Another approach that could be used includes providing funding for a regional 
coast guard or improving the capacity of regional navies to improve law enforcement and 
security.  Yemen, Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti all have small coast guards or navies, 
but none have effective capabilities.  Capacity-building programs, provided by the United 
States or other extra-regional nations to increase the number of ships, personnel and 
training, could provide a sufficient deterrent factor that increases the risk-to-reward ratio 
for pirates. 
Second, coordination and communication among regional nations is essential to 
reducing the number of pirate attacks.  In Southeast Asia, multilateral naval and air 
patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore provided an increased naval and air 
presence, which strengthened security and reduced the number of pirate attacks in the 




Djibouti code of conduct, which acknowledges piracy and emphasizes communication 
and cooperation, but does little else.  Insufficient political will and the inability of 
regional governments to provide forces have made this method impracticable as well. 
This analysis shows that a domestic solution is required in order to eliminate or 
seriously reduce piracy.  Historically, the international response has focused on the 
symptoms of piracy, while failing to address the underlying causes that have allowed it to 
spin out of control.  In the absence of conditions to improve economic and political 
considerations within Somalia and throughout the region, the temporary international 
naval response needs to become permanent.  The question that needs to be asked is 
whether the United States, NATO, EU NAVFOR and other maritime nations can remain 
in substantial numbers in the HOA indefinitely.  Increasing global commitments to the 
war on terror, waged by the United States and its allies, and the complexity of 
maintaining a significant naval presence, provides room for doubt.  The global economic 
crisis has stressed the economies of many countries, a situation that could cause them to 
rethink their commitment to providing forces.  In addition, operating in the HOA is a 
difficult task because of the environment and the distances involved.  If the maritime 
presence was reduced or removed, it is highly likely that piracy would rage further out of 
control. 
Even if foreign governments are able to foster a domestic solution to address only 
a few of the causal factors of piracy, it will likely take years before results will manifest 
themselves through better security at sea.  Piracy has become entrenched in the 
communities that support it, and it will require measures that address the grievances of 
fishermen, which sparked the crisis of piracy in the first place.  In the end, the last line of 
defense against piracy rests with ships and their crewmembers.  Defensive measures that 
can evolve faster than the pirates’ abilities to counter them may very well be the only 
response that can truly stop pirates from attacking ships. 
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